# Posted 3:58 PM by Ariel David Adesnik  

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: SAUDI ARABIA. I admit it. I've been somewhat derelict in providing the posts on Islam and democracy which I promised both long ago and just last week. I blame Kim Jong Il.

Previous posts in this series have focused on Algeria and Egypt. Now its the Saudis' turn. As before, my report will consist of a summary of and commentary on an essay in the Journal of Democracy.

In short, there is no good news about democracy in Saudi Arabia. But what's good about the bad news is the kind of bad news that it is. Dictatorship in Saudi Arabia is a product of greed and the struggle for power. It is not the final bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism.

So how bad is bad? For starters, there has never been an election in Saudi Arabia. There are no political parties. The press and judiciary are entirely subordinate to the regime. NGOs are all but forbidden. Arrests are arbitary. And women are treated like property.

While this sort of description suggests that the Saudi monarchy is an almost totalitarian dictatorship, it isn't. The royal family itself is an oligarchy, with thousands of princes participating in the struggle for power. Commoners play a leading role in the powerful oil, finance and commerce sectors, roles which the royals dare not challenge lest they provoke a rebellion. The commoners also dominate the bureaucracy.

Finally, conservative Wahabist clerics dominate the religious establishment. This domination is not a product of the recent fundamentalist surge in Middle East, but rather a traditional arrangement dating to the 18th century, when the royal house of Saud bought the loyalty of the Wahabist (or Al Sheikh) clan by granting it control of religious affairs.

The current balance between these three factions may not withstand the demographic revolution that has begun to engulf Sauid Arabia, however. Thirty years ago, there were fewer than 5 million Saudis. Now there are more than 15 million, plus 6 million foreign workers who are not citizens. Half the population is under 16.

Between 250,000 and 500,000 new workers enter the job market each year. Having failed to diversify its oil-based economy, Saudi Arabia struggles to provide jobs for this new generation. Even worse, employers prefer to hire Indian and Pakistani immigrants, who are just as well-educated as their Saudi counterparts but who can be paid much less.

In theory, the government should take advantage of its oil revenues to finance industrial diversification. But from a political perspective, that just isn't possible. The government's massive arms expenditures -- which could finance considerable diversification -- are in fact a subsidy to an industry dominated by the royal family. With no other source of income, the princes won't give up their share.

At the same time, the commoner-dominated bureaucracy refuses to facilitate diversification by means of deregulation, since the commoners fear that an economic opening would enable the princes to buy out commoner-owned industries, thus destroying the commoner elite's power base.

Finally, borrowing is not an option since the government has run budget deficits for more than two decades. As it well knows, the lethal combination of debt and deficit could destroy the kingdom's blue chip image and place it on the road to Latin Americanization.

An important question for advocates of democracy promotion is whether a growing Saudi underclass might embrace Islamic fundmentalism as the only available means of striking back at the regime. According to Jean-Francois Seznec, the Columbia University professor who authored the Journal of Democracy's article on Saudi Arabia,

The Wahabis themselves are very much divided: There are the traditionalist proponents of a "purer" Islam who support the regime [and] advocate reform by peaceful means...Then there are the "jihadis", who are generally younger, advocate change through violence -- they include the followers of Osama bin Laden -- and are widely disparaged as unstable hotheads. Their ideas frighten most Saudis, particularly the middle class. Despite Western impressions that a broad and deep stream of radical, anti-democratic Islamism runs just beneath the surface of Saudi society, the jihadis support is slim.

I hope Seznec is right, though I am skeptical. Then again, my knowledge of Saudi Arabia derives entirely from the Western press. As I know from personal experience in Argentina, the Western media often provide a profoundly disorted -- and generally alarmist -- account of local politics.

Still, Seznec seems to err on the side of optimist too often for my taste (and I am an optimist). For example, he presents the creation of the Shura, or appointed advisory council to the king, as a major step toward political decompression. Its deliberations receive wide coverage in the Saudi media. But I am not impressed. Seznec presents no evidence that the Shura has actual influence. Nor is there any reason to believe that it could withstand an effort by the king to destroy it.

As I have said before, the best hope for democratization in Saudi Arabia is pressure from the United States. We have to make it clear that the long-term health of the US-Saudi alliance depends on the future of democracy in Saudi Arabia. Right now, that does not sound credible. But if Saudi Arabia found itself bordered by a democratic Iran and a democratic Iraq, it might no longer take American support for granted.

A critical turning point in Saudi politics will come with the appointment of a new king after the death of the ailing Fahd. While rumor has it that Crown Prince Abdullah favors holding municipal elections, he cannot pass reform without the support of the selfsame princes whose authority elections might challenge. Since the monarchy is not hereditary, Abdullah will have to negotiate with his fellow princes before assuming the kingship. During those negotiations, the United States has to make clear to the the conservative factions of the royal family that their long-term interests will be best served if they grant the Saudi people the freedom that they deserve.





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