# Posted 1:29 AM by Ariel David Adesnik  

PLAGIARISM PART THREE: Part one is here, part two here. Now here's the rest:

4) Constraints

a) Domestic Constraints:

i) First and foremost of all constraints is the 2004 election. At the moment, both polling data and a survey of the experts indicate that no Democratic candidate can come close to matching the President’s credibility on national security issues. Thus, the best hope of a Democratic victory may be a dramatic economic downturn similar to the one that unseated the President’s father. Alternately, a significant terrorist attack on US soil may destroy the President’s credibility and create an even playing field.

(1) Given the President’s credibility advantage, there is little reason to believe he will change much of his foreign policy in response to electoral pressure.

(2) While the media continues to highlight the prospect that increasing casualties in Iraq may provoke a public backlash, the polls show no indication of such a phenomenon, regardless of how many headlines each casualty gathers. In all likelihoood, cabinet infighting will have much more to say about the future of Iraq than electoral pressure.

(3) Even if a Democrat wins 2004, it is highly likely that the US will continue on the same basic course it has until now, albeit showing somewhat more deference to Europe.

(a) The one Democrat who may change US foreign policy considerably is former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean. However, the chances of him winning the Democratic primary, let alone the general election are extremely remote.

ii) Congress: In the 1980’s, the Democratic-controlled Congress quickly became the President’s bete noir on all sorts of foreign policy issues. Two important changes have taken place since then, however:

(1) First is the return to Republican control.

(2) The second, and perhaps more important, is the reduction in partisan tension regarding foreign policy ever since the end of the Cold War. There are no longer any clear Democratic-Republican dividing lines, even if one can say that Republicans tend to be more hawkish. After all, it was Trent Lott who told Bill Clinton to "Give peace a chance."

(3) At the moment, Congressional criticism has focused on three main subjects: Homeland security, the State of the Union/uranium flap, and the occupation of Iraq. As mentioned above, Homeland security has not had much traction and will gain momentum unless another attack occurs. The uranium controversy is also dying out. With regard to Iraq, Congress mainly seems interested in ensuring a serious American commitment to rebuilding, rather than calling for a withdrawal as the media projected.

b) International constraints

i) Bush administration critics argued throughout the buildup to the invasion of Iraq that a unilateral policy would do lasting damage to transatlantic relations, the United Nations and the international system. Despite the continuing failure of the Administration to justify the invasion by locating any weapons of mass destruction, the US relationship with Europe and the UN seems reasonably stable.

(1) The main point of contention seems to be the occupation of Iraq, with most opponents of the war refusing to commit any forces to its reconstruction. On most other matters, cooperation is going ahead as usual.

ii) There has also been little reaction in the Arab world to the US occupation of Iraq, despite widespread predictions of a regional upheaval driven by anti-imperialist Islamic fundamentalism By and large, the United States authoritarian allies in the region have begun to spin out a new reformist rhetoric while giving few indications they intend to carry through on its implications.

5) Scenarios:

a) "Pax Americana" – Probability: 40%

i) As specified in your initial comments this scenario would entail significant success in Iraq and Afghanistan. Conventional wisdom suggests that neither is probable.

(1) However, I believe that assessments of the situation in Iraq have been marred by an instinctive pessimism. Thus, I consider it extremely likely that there will be an elected, civilian government within 24 months and that the overall state structure (police, judiciary, legislature, armed forces, etc.) will be at least as resilient as some of the relatively stable Latin American democracies.

(2) In contrast, Afghanistan cannot hope for much more than a continuation of the status quo, excepting the validation of the current government by reasonably democratic elections in the near future.

(3) An optimistic yet still realistic scenario for the Middle East should also include internally-driven regime change in Iran and a reduction of tension in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

ii) The Pax scenario might also include a multilateral resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, with the North trading its nuclear program for a combination of aid and security guarantees.

iii) The absence of any further attacks on American soil is critical to this scenario.

iv) The re-election of President Bush is NOT essential to this scenario. If the US economy falls into recession once again, Bush’s successor may be a centrist Democrat with a foreign policy that emphasizes the status quo of rebuilding Iraq and negotiating with North Korea.

(1) If President Bush is re-elected, the rise of any given faction within his cabinet may not have great significance, since the positive trend in world events will reinforce the current ideological course.

b) "Manning the Barricades" – Probability: 40% The US suffers no major setbacks, but nor does the war on terror progress.

i) A new Iraqi state emerges but has its legitimacy called into question by a one-sided constitution, a failure to provide basic services, ethno-religious tensions or all of the above. Reform does not advance in neighboring countries. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process stalls.

ii) The Karzai government accepts de facto warlord rule outside the capital.

iii) There is no resolution of the North Korean crisis. New rounds of talks alternate with rhetorical escalation.

iv) Al Qaeda or other terrorist forces attack US military installations in the Middle East, inflicting moderate casualties. Small attacks on US soil also possible.

v) The outcome of the 2004 will probably have little impact on this scenario. However, if the President is re-elected, enough delay may enable realists in the administration to reduce the US commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan, thus increasing the possibility of major failure 5-8 years from now.

c) "Retreat and Rentrenchment" – Probability: 20%

i) As a stillborn Iraqi state begins to decay, realists and non-ideological hawks take control of the administration agenda. After a single flawed election, the US declares the occupation successful and withdraws. A similar scenario plays out in Afghanistan. Reform stalls throughout the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian fighting flares.

ii) North Korea, possibly joined by a reinvigorated Iranian theocracy, mounts a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and returns the world to the brink of war.

iii) Al Qaeda launches a successful attack on American soil, with hundreds of casualties. Other smaller scale attacks take place regularly around the globe.

iv) The push for retrenchment at home is led either by newly-empowered realists in a second Bush administration, or Vietnam-era liberals in a leftward tilting Democratic administration.

v) Come 2008, America finds itself sharply divided between those who believe that the cause of the current chaos is the Administration’s timidity and those who believe that the sins of the first Bush administration are still provoking a violent backlash across the globe.

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