OxBlog

Friday, August 15, 2003

# Posted 11:19 PM by Ariel David Adesnik  

SHAMELESS SELF-PLAGIARISM: A friend of mine at a consulting firm asked for my thoughts on his firm's projections regarding the development of US foreign policy over the course of the next 2-5 years. Since I spent a good amount of time on it and actually had fun doing it, I thought I'd reproduce my comments here on OxBlog.

While I can't republish my friend's remarks, you don't need to know exactly what he said in order to understand what I'm saying. If something doesn't make sense at first glance, just read a few more lines and I'm sure you'll pick it up from the context. So here goes:
1) Grand Strategy: [Defined as] Objectives, Capabilities, [and] Constraints

a) I think this is a very solid overall framework. Of course, given that it strongly resembles the approach to strategic thinking I worked on with John Gaddis and laid out in my [earlier paper], my comfort with this approach isn’t all that suprising. ;)

b) I think it is very important that you distinguish between domestic and international constraints and take the latter very seriously, since traditional strategists often dismiss the former, especially the role of Congress, the media and public opinion.

c) In your comments, you raise the question of strategic coherence. I agree that this is an extremely important question. I suggest, however, that you approach it in terms of cabinet infighting and not just in terms of pure theoretical consistency.
i) In terms of both objectives as well [as] policy process, there is a strong resemblance between the current administration and that of Ronald Reagan. In fact, the current administration resembles that of President Reagan much more than it does that of the President’s own father.

ii) Above all, this similarity rests on the presence of a president with basically hawkish instincts but few fixed ideas about foreign policy. (Reagan partsians tend to insist [that] the 40th president had a very developed strategy, but it is hard to know what that consisted of beyond forceful anti-Communism. By the same token, the current President is an uncompromising opponent of terrorism, broadly defined.)

iii) Given the President’s lack of fixed ideas, he is extremely susceptible both to arguments presented by his advisers as well as arguments suggested by sudden upheavals in world politics.
(1) As is well known, the administration pursued a firm "realist" policy before Sept. 11th, with "realism" being defined as a focus on "great" powers and firm opposition to nation-building or other humanitarian projects. Then, as a result of the WTC and Pentagon attacks, there was a dramatic change in both the President’s world view and the influence of certain factions within his cabinet.
iv) ONE CANNOT SEPARATE THE INFLUENCE OF EVENTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF ADVISORS. While Condoleeza Rice retained considerable influence even after Sept. 11th, her foreign policy agenda was shunted aside and has not even begun its return to center stage. She has retained influence by virtue of her personal connection to the President and willingness to abandon her prior agenda. In contrast, world events validated the world view of men such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, thus increasing their influence with the President.
(1) It is extremely important to keep in mind the differences between those like Rumsfeld and those like Wolfowitz, in spite of the fact that the media tends to label them [jointly] as either hawks or neo-conservatives or both.

(a) Wolfowitz has a much clearer agenda as well a fierce ideological commitment to it. Wolfowitz believes in the inherent superiority of American democracy and the possibility/obligation of transforming the Middle East by introducing it to a democratic way of life. This principled ideological commitment ensures that Wolfowitz and his associates have both a comprehensive as well as a somewhat inflexible approach to foreign affairs.

(b) Rumsfeld and others like him (especially Cheney) are hawks rather than ideologues. They believe in the efficacy of force but seem to have few clear principles that indicate where and when force should be used (although international approval of such force seems essentially irrelevant). Thus, their reaction are much harder predict. Thus, they tend to have a much shorter attention and be much more susceptible to the pressures of electoral politics. Finally, Rumsfeld & Co. tend to share Rice’s aversion to nation-building and humanitarian action.

(c) The Powell wing of the administration tends to be extremely skeptical of both Wolfowitz’s ideological vision and the Rumsfeld/Cheney camp’s instinctive hawkishness. While Powell & Co. seem reliably committed to building international consensus, they do not seem to have any clear agenda beyond a desire to moderate the ambitions of the Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld camps. Again, this frustrates prediction and creates susceptibility to electoral politics.

(d) In sum, it might be said that whereas the Wolfowitz camp has a fixed agenda, the Rumsfel/Cheney and Powell camps have fixed tactics and an agenda dictated by unexpected events.
To Be Continued...
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