# Posted 9:38 PM by Ariel David Adesnik  

ABU GHRAIB AND THE FUTURE OF A DEMOCRATIC IRAQ: Right now is the calm before the storm. We know that the horrific abuse of Iraqi prisoners will derail American efforts to build a stable and democratic Iraq. We just don't know how.

What does it mean to lose hearts and minds? How will we know when the fallout from Abu Ghraib is undermining the American-led reconstruction? Will there be mass demonstrations across Iraq? Will there be nation-wide prison riots that provoke further American abuse? Will law and order break down in the few places where it now exists? And how can the United States prepare itself for the chaos to come?

Today's WaPo has some good suggestions about how, in the short-term, to demonstrate an American commitment to international law: raze Abu Ghraib, announce that the Geneva Conventions will apply to all detainees, and allow Iraqi and international monitors to visit the Coalition's prisons.

But what comes after damage control? In the absence of an implementation plan for the June 30 transition, it is almost impossible to know how Abu Ghraib will affect the handover. For a long moment, any proposal with an American imprint on it may become poisonous to Iraqi representatives. Thus, it is fortunate that there is a UN representative handling the process at the moment. Even so, any proposal the Americans support may become controversial for precisely that reason.

The real issue, however, is elections. First, can the United States hold out until January? Will Abu Ghraib add fuel to the fire of the Sadr and Ba'athist insurgencies? My guess is that will affect the former much less than the letter. Over at Needlenose, Swopa makes a pretty persuasive argument that Sistani and other influential Shi'ites are doing all that they can to crush the Sadrist rebellion. Thus, I don't expect the Shia rank-and-file to vent their anger at the Americans by supporting Sadr.

The fact that Sistani is doing so much of our work for us vis-a-vis Sadr reflects a fundamental truth of the occupation: that those who expect to gain the most from the elections will always be our best allies. The WaPo writes that

America's greatest strength in Iraq remains that its goals are not only right but shared by most Iraqis, by most people of goodwill in other democracies and by the leadership of the United Nations.

That point is very similar to the one I am making, but it ignores the fact that goodwill isn't worth much without institutional structures to express it. Sistani provides that sort of structure for Iraqi Shi'ites. The Kurdish political parties provide it for the Kurds. No one seems to be providing it for the Sunnis.

All the Sunnis have is an institution capable of expressing rage: the Ba'athist insurgency. Thus, I expect that the reaction to Abu Ghraib will be increased support for the insurgency within the Sunni triangle (assuming that such support hasn't already reached its theoretical maximum.)

While it may seem trivial to point out that our best allies are the ones who have the most to gain from elections, that idea has some very important implications. Above it all, it illustrates Robert Kagan's argument why it will be even harder to stabilize Iraq if we abandon our goal of promoting a democratic order. If we start looking for "responsible", "pro-Western" generals to run the show, we would have a real Shi'ite insurgency on our hands, not to mention a Kurdish secession.

In other words, the best advice I have is to just stay the course. It's not original. It's not insightful. But it is better than the irresponsible alternatives.

UPDATE: Kagan & Kristol offer a modified version of staying-the-course: move up elections to September. In other words, make the course shorter so that staying it isn't as hard. (0) opinions -- Add your opinion