# Posted 2:10 AM by Patrick Belton  

FROM OUR AFGHANISTAN CORRESPONDENT: This week, a look at warlords, in and out of Kabul....

Most Western news coverage of post-Taliban Afghanistan presumes something like the following narrative: The early failure of the American-led coalition to shore up the Kabul government of Hamid Karzai led to a renaissance of warlords throughout Afghanistan. The power of these regional military commanders and the weakness of the central government has led to all sorts of disasters: an increase in poppy cultivation, a rash of human rights abuses (especially against women), and a severe blow to the rule of law throughout the country. However, the U.S. is reluctant to antagonize the regional commanders, needing their cooperation in hunting down the remnants of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. So the U.S. continues to wink at the warlords, leaving Karzai impotent to rule the country of which he is nominally President.

Most of this story is of course true. But the main element of the proposed solution -- strengthening Hamid Karzai and the central government against the regional commanders -- I would argue is misguided. Instead, the U.S. and Afghan governments should demand disarmament and elections from all warlords, but (assuming the warlords win at least the first round of provincial elections) should also allow their regional governments to retain considerable powers. The U.N. and editorialists everywhere are right to propose expansion of ISAF, the international security force (now run by NATO) that has brought relative stability to Kabul. Its role, however, should not be to extend the authority of the central government, but rather to enforce the general disarmament program, to firmly moderate disputes between local commanders, and to defend journalists, political parties, and activists who lawfully challenge the interests of the dominant warlord. Western donors should encourage regional governors to respect human rights, follow the rule of law, and wean their farmers off poppy by rewarding those governors who do so with increased development assistance.

In an earlier dispatch, I briefly laid out my reasons for being wary of fostering a strong central government in Afghanistan. Here in more detail is my sense of current trends shaping Afghan politics, and the conclusions I draw from them. I'd welcome any comments from more knowledgeable souls who happen to be reading this.

First: the Taliban movement is a spent force in Afghan politics. This is not to discount the dangers from the continuing violence in southeast Afghanistan; there, the U.S. faces an insurgency that will likely fester for years to come. But the distinctive features of the Taliban regime -- the stifling theocracy supported by foreign funds and arms -- are unlikely to be successfully revived. What the Western coalition and the Karzai government face in the south is less a Taliban resurgence than a Pushtun insurgency, whose leaders include former Taliban but also fellow Pushtun Gulbuddin Hekmetyar (who was fighting the Taliban five years ago). Bereft of Saudi and Pakistani support, this movement stands little chance of sweeping Afghanistan like the mullahs in the late 1990s. Rather, the south-eastern resistance threatens a return to the ethnic civil war and chaos of the early 1990s. The Kabul government no longer face a movement capable of taking over the country; rather, it faces regional insurgencies, capable of making the country ungovernable.

The Taliban were initially welcomed in Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan for bringing stability after a long and devastating civil war. This welcome will never be repeated. Across the north, resentment of ordinary Afghans toward the Taliban remains intense. The mullahs are remembered chiefly for their hostility to music, sport, and many other small joys of life. My friend Mumtaz recalls being beaten with a leather-covered piece of steel rebar for refusing to give up his wedding ring (an "unIslamic" adornment, according to the Taliban border guards who wanted to take it from him). The Taliban demand that all men grow long beards is well known; but some mullahs also enforced a cleanliness code which included the shaving of men's armpits. These Taliban would check men for shaven armpits, and if they found an unshaven offender, they would wind his body hair around a pencil and yank it out. Add to these sorts of unpleasant abuses the fact that most of the Taliban were from Afghanistan's majority Pashtun ethnic group, and it's understandable that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and people of other ethnicities living in central and north Afghanistan would sooner see the country dismembered than see it ruled again by the Taliban.

Islamist bullying continues to afflict Afghans living under conservative warlords like Ismael Khan in Herat or Sayyaf in Paghman. But notwithstanding the efforts of its conservative Supreme Court Chief Justice (an ally of Sayyaf), Kabul is moving into a new era. Modestly clad women appear as newsreaders on TV, while sexually suggestive Hindi film posters adorn shopfronts about town. Even in areas where Sayyaf's militia have harassed shopkeepers for playing music in public, the shopkeepers' first response was, "Look, the Taliban are gone now -- we can play music if we want to." The stadium used as an execution ground by the Taliban was packed on May 14 by thousands of fans of the popular Afghan singer Farhad Darya (including several excited friends of mine -- who unfortunately only mentioned the concert to me after it had already taken place). On other days, the stadium is used to train the dozen or so athletes who will compete in the Athens Olympic games this summer, including two women.

General bitterness against the foreign sponsors of the Taliban is intense, especially among Afghans who have traveled enough to know that Pakistanis and Arabs do not live by similarly restrictive creeds. One of my Afghan friends lived in the Emirates for a while, and recalled attending a festival where a group of young Arab men changed into Western clothes and began enthusiastically to dance to a Michael Jackson pop tune. His response was incredulity: "They send us mullahs to teach us Qur'an, and they teach themselves break-dancing?" These days, both the Pakistani and Saudi governments have realized the folly of fostering Islamists in their backyard. Without their extensive support, no neo-Taliban movement is likely to win out on a national scale.

With the Taliban gone, what has replaced them? Unfortunately, control of the Kabul government is widely perceived as having passed from one ethnic group to another: from Pashtuns to Tajiks, and in particular, to the Tajik clans from the valley of Panjshir. Resentment over this fact runs deep. I'm reminded of a lamentable conversation I had with an Afghan colleague who, until that point, I had quite liked. We were on a long trip in a project vehicle, and I was being instructed about the general canniness of the Afghan people. "The Afghans are very clever people. They tricked Brezhnev. They tricked your president, too. There is a saying here: They killed the serpent but they hatched the dragon." My colleague fell silent, glancing around darkly. I assumed he was talking about how in driving out the Russians, America financed the Islamist elements that eventually gave birth to the Taliban. But later, when we were out of the vehicle, he clarified for me in a hushed voice, smiling nervously and without humor. "You must understand, the Panjshiris are in charge here. The drivers are almost all Panjshiri, and the guards. There are things I can not say when I am in the car. They watch us, and they plot, and they report back to their Centre. It is all underground." He named a number of my good friends at the office. "They have all connections, this is why they get jobs -- this is why they are the ones chosen for the overnight trips. The Americans are very foolish. They threw out the Taliban, but they put the Panjshiris in power, and they are very much worse."

The long valley of Panjshir begins two or three hours northeast of Kabul, and is legendarily defensible. Ahmad Shah Massoud held it against the Soviets for a decade; he emerged to fight over Kabul with his fellow mujahidin commanders in the early 1990s, then was driven back to Panjshir again by the Taliban. Massoud was the primary military commander of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance until his assassination by suicide bombers on September 9, 2001 -- two days before Osama bin Laden ensured that the Northern Alliance would receive enough American assistance to retake Kabul and expel the Taliban.

Massoud's successor was Mohammad Fahim, a fellow Panjshiri Tajik. While helping the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum drive the Taliban out of northern Afghanistan, Fahim also pushed south, occupying Kabul despite American requests for restraint. He successfully angled for the three most powerful positions in the new interim government, claiming the post of Defense Minister for himself and the Foreign and Interior Ministries for his allies Dr. Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni. (Qanuni lost the Interior Ministry in negotiations at the loya jirga of 2002, and became Education Minister instead). All three men were Panjshiri, Tajik, and leaders of the Jamiat-e-Islami faction of the mujahidin. They ensured that other influential governorships and posts (police chief of Kabul, district heads around the Kabul area) went to Jamiat members and allies. Far more than Hamid Karzai and his fellow West-friendly technocrats, these men compose the central government of Afghanistan.

Fahim's control of the Defense Ministry gives him de facto control over the Afghan National Army (ANA). Given the circumstances in which America ousted the Taliban, it was probably inevitable that the new army would be dominated by the top military commander of the Northern Alliance. But as I discussed in an earlier post, the perception that the army is a tool of the Jamiat warlords greatly diminishes the effectiveness of the internationally-led disarmament program -- what warlord will agree to give the army a monopoly on force when that army is set to be controlled for the foreseeable future by an arch-rival? Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to work closely with Fahim in operations against Taliban remnants -- and against warlords who might otherwise get too uppity.

Here is where the narrative of a central government barely able to maintain control outside Kabul seems to me to be only partly true. Fahim is a highly canny man, and is playing an intricate power game against the other warlords. The last few months have seen violence or the threat of violence in provincial capitals throughout Afghanistan. This has largely been portrayed in Western media as a sign of the continuing failure and weakness of the central government. I believe that it is instead a sign of the Kabul government's ongoing attempts to extend its power to the major cities, in areas where it cannot hope to control the countryside -- and in some cases it is succeeding.

In April, just before I arrived in Afghanistan for this trip, the papers reported that warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum had driven out the Kabul-appointed governor of Faryab province and seized the capital, Maimuna. The headlines were dramatic, painting a picture of a violent coup d'etat, a gauntlet tossed in Karzai's face. CBS News described it as a "major burst of militia violence," like the outburst in Herat earlier in March. The local military commander, Hashimi Habibi, claimed that "fierce fighting" was underway. Maimuna is a long ways from Kabul, and it was nearly impossible for any news agency to actually get reporters on the ground to observe the ostensible coup. So they reported what the Interior Ministry told them.

I got a rather different story from a British friend who lives and works in Maimuna. He said there was no major militia fighting going on -- that for most of the people of Maimuna, the first they knew of the "coup" was when a whole lot of Afghan National Army soldiers appeared in the streets. There had been a demonstration the day before that ended in a charge on the governors' mansion, but it had not led to major militia fighting. I asked him who was in charge now in Maimuna. He shrugged. "The Army, I suppose," he said. The more I discussed the situation with him, the more it seemed that Dostum had been the dupe rather than the perpetrator of the seizure of Maimuna.

Abdul Rashid Dostum is one of the more infamous warlords in Afghanistan and the top ethnic Uzbek commander, dominating several northern provinces. During the Soviet occupation, he sided with the Russians until just before they were driven out, then switched sides and won lasting control of Mazar-e-Sharif, the main city of northern Afghanistan. His human rights records is appalling. While he ran Mazar, he held public executions at which criminals were crushed beneath tanks, and he was almost certainly responsible for ethnic cleansing in the wake of the Taliban defeat in the north. He is now a Deputy Defense Minister and special advisor to Hamid Karzai, with effective control over security affairs in the north (which allows him to maintain his militia and its political arm, the Junbesh party). As discussed earlier, this control is sharply contested in the area around Mazar by Atta Mohammad, the local commander of Fahim's Jamiat-e-Islami.

Faryab province is on the margins of Dostum's sphere of influence. Its former governor, Anayatullah, and its local military commander, General Hashimi Habibi, had been Dostum's clients. But in April Habibi went over to the Tajiks, declaring that his loyalty was to Marshal Fahim and the national government. Dostum seems to have decided that his initial response would be through street politics, not military confrontation. His Junbesh party organized a protest against Governor Anayatullah, accusing him (probably accurately) of using state funds to buy votes in the upcoming elections. At the height of the protest, four to six people were killed when Anayatullah's guards clumsily opened fire -- the only casualties, I believe, that were actually documented from the "fierce militia fighting" in Maimuna. This enraged the crowd and terrified the governor, who was smuggled out the back window of his mansion by British Army Gurkhas, managing to break his leg in the process.

I've found no evidence that Dostum was in any position to take advantage of this sudden power vacuum in Maimuna -- he seems to have been as surprised as anyone. But the central government moved immediately. Hence the sudden appearance of the Afghan National Army in the streets, and stern statements from the Defense and Interior Ministers (Fahim and Jalali) condemning Dostum's "aggression," and U.S. warplanes hovering ominously over the Uzbek warlord's home in Shiberghan. Dostum shrilly threatened to bring the government down if the Defense and Interior Ministers were not both sacked for this "outrage," and protested that this was aggression by the government, not his militia. The Ministers weren't sacked, of course, and the news coverage of Dostum's protests was dismissive -- everyone knows that Dostum's an expansionist (and a right bastard to boot). But in this case his outrage seems to have been genuine. The Maimuna kerfuffle was a sharp demonstration of the Kabul government's ability to project power – a pre-emptive slap on Dostum's wrist, and an expansion of control over one provincial capital.

According to the standard narrative, this would be cause for cheer: a point for Karzai against the warlords. But it's not. It's a point for one set of warlords against another set of warlords, for Fahim and his clients against Dostum and his clients. And the Panjshiri warlords are scarcely more pleasant than Dostum. A couple of government ministers are, like Karzai, technocrats returned from the West (Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali); they are generally willing to accept criticism and dissent. The former mujahidin commanders are generally not. Anyone in doubt on that point should browse through the Human Rights Watch report of one year ago entitled "Killing You Is A Very Easy Thing For Us," which extensively chronicles the human rights abuses perpetrated by warlords in the Kabul government and those allied to them.

Sayyaf is probably the worst; his militia has been allowed to bully, rape, and murder with impunity right next door to Kabul. But even the less brutal mujahidin are scarcely West-friendly. As Education Minister, Qanuni has promoted thuggish conservatives who intimidate female teachers, accusing them of Westernization and Communism. The Jamiat has retained control of the intelligence services, Amniat-e-Melli ("National Security") and used them to intimidate and harass independent journalists and political opponents. A journalist described his interrogation by the Amniat and their transparent hostility to the democratic project in Afghanistan. "Their main argument was that democracy was doomed to defeat and will end in catastrophe. They were calm and polite at first and listened to my arguments. But then later, they said that what we do, our party, is in favor of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the United States." The Jamiat know who their potential enemies are.

The main threat to Afghanistan right now is disintegration in a tide of ethnic insurgency. Many extremely intelligent people see this, and argue that we need to counter it by strengthening the powers of a multi-ethnic central government in Kabul. But it is extremely hard to guarantee that a government stays multi-ethnic, especially if one sincerely tries to add democracy into the mix... witness the contorted and at times catastrophic attempts to balance between Sunnis, Shias, and Maronites in Lebanon. The current dominance of Panjshiri Tajiks is unbearable to many Afghans; a Pushtun dominance following free and fair elections would only reverse the problem. I suggest that the best solution is to devolve a great deal of economic and political power to the provincial level -- don't give the warlords a prize to fight over in Kabul! The Kabul government (with firm supervision from the US and other Western nations) should concentrate on developing and deploying a neutral army and police force to disarm the militias and provide security in the regions. That means biting two political bullets: shoehorning Fahim out of the Defence Ministry, and expanding NATO troops throughout the country (to put teeth in the disarmament program and help an initially weak Afghan security force keep the peace). These are important steps no matter what; but I fear that if they are carried out without also giving more power to the regions, they will only convince every warlord that they have to control Kabul in order to survive.

The new Afghan constitution is not, it must be admitted, particularly friendly to my devolution plan. It envisions elected provincial councils which "take part in securing the development targets of the state... and give advice on important issues falling within the domain of the province." These councils are to work "in cooperation with the provincial administration," the appointed governor and his administrators. In other words, the elected office serves a mainly advisory role, while the most powerful provincial office is appointed from Kabul. This leads to unfortunate attention-getting devices like the recent fighting in remote Ghor province, where commander Abdul Salaam demanded that Karzai appoint him to the local administration, and invaded the provincial capital when no appointment was forthcoming. (At least, that's the story... the Afghan National Army was promptly deployed to the provincial capital to eject Salaam back into the countryside, and I suppose it's possible that as with the Maimuna fighting, the government exaggerated Salaam's offences. But there have been credible casualty reports coming out of Ghor).

On the other hand, the constitution also states that "The government, while preserving the principle of centralism, shall in accordance with the law delegate certain authorities to local administration units for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social, and cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of people in the development of nations." It doesn't explicitly spell out the division of labor between the councils and the appointed administrators. Since all these institutions are a bit fluid, I propose that the governor should be elected -- preferably, even, that the Chairman of the elected council should be the governor -- and that the central government should delegate extensively to the elected governor. If the Kabul government then focuses on security issues and creating a safe space for local elections, hopefully the attention of the warlords will turn to vote-winning, and not to replaying last decade's fight for Kabul.

Incidentally, if you happened to find this an analysis that you haven't read in the print media, i.e., where print journalists -- especially those focusing on politics -- are far more mediocre, their authors mixing fact with opinion and under no obligation to be either fair or accurate, or even to leave their comfortable hotel bar and do their own reporting when they can just rely on the reportorial herd, then why don't you email the Washington Post's Brian Faler and let him know? Tell him we sent you! (1) opinions -- Add your opinion