# Posted 9:13 AM by Ariel David Adesnik  

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: EGYPT. While guest blogging over at The Volokh Conspiracy a few weeks ago, I promised to provide in-depth, country-by-country accounts of the prospects for demcratization in the Middle East. I started out with Algeria, but didn't follow up on it. Until now. This week I'm going to be writing about Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Morocco (in that order).

But first, a brief recap. As I said before I want to present a comprehensive, empirical case for the viability of democratization in the Middle East. The previous round of this debate focused on the cultural incompatibility of democracy and Islam. This time I want to focus on the situation on the ground in the Middle East. As I see it, a strong case for democratization must respond to what I called the "Iranian paradigm", or the belief that reform promotes both terrorism and fundamentalism.

So what about Egypt? It made headlines last month when the government broadcast a vicious anti-Semitic television program based on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Going back somewhat further, Egypt is best known for the brutal attacks by Muslim fundamentalists that resulted in the murder dozens of Pyramid-bound tourists. Thus, at first glance, the Mubarak dictatorship seems to be the only thing standing in the way of an Islamic revolution. Even so, leading analysts such as Fareed Zakaria have asserted that

If we could choose one place to press hardest to reform, it should be Egypt. Jordan has a more progressive ruler; Saudi Arabia is more critical because of its oil. But Egypt is the intellectual soul of the Arab world. If it were to progress economically and politically, it would demonstrate more powerfully than any essay or speech that Islam is compatible with modernity, and that Arabs can thrive in today's world. (Newsweek, 24 Dec 01 [permalink expired])

Perhaps. But Colin Powell isn't listening. Just after September 11th, he described Mubarak's brutality as a model for the war on terror. Or, as Powell put it,

Egypt, as all of us know, is really ahead of us on this issue. They have had to deal with acts of terrorism in recent years in the course of their history. And we have much to learn from them and there is much we can do together.

Recognizing the significance of what Powell said, Mubarak later responded that "There is no doubt that the events of September 11 created a new concept of democracy."

But suppose for a moment that Powell & co. wanted to get serious about Egyptian democracy. Would they just be opening the floodgates of fundamentalism? I think not. In an article in the most recent issue of the Journal of Democracy, Princeton doctoral candidate Jason Brownlee reviews the prospects for democracy in Egypt. Put mildly, Brownlee is not optimistic. But the problem isn't fundamentalism. It's Mubarak.

While consolidating his power in the years after Sadat's assassination, Mubarak spoke of administering "democracy in doses". Thousands of NGOs sprang into existence, as well as professional organizations for lawyers, doctors, etc. The opposition even began to gain ground in the Assembly. Once Mubarak consolidated his position, however, he shut down all avenues of dissent. Newspapers were closed, human rights activists jailed and political opponents given military trials.

To be sure, Egypt has faced a threat of Islamist violence. The annual death toll from its guerrilla conflict reached 1,000 in 1993. But by 1998, the government had crushed the armed opposition. While the memory of slaughtered tourists lives on, it does not reflect the realities of Egypt today. Now Mubarak is focused on crushing non-violent Islamic dissent as well. And he has no intention of letting other dissenters organize either. The regime has rejected the application of every political party that sought to organize over the past decade, including an explicitly pro-democratic party made up of both Muslims and Christians. Clearly, Mubarak's main interest is in preserving his own absolute power, not defending Egypt from fundamentalist Islam.

In a surprising announcement in November 1999, Mubarak informed the public that the next year's elections to the Assembly would be "subject at all stages to supervision by the judiciary." The legislation implementing this announcement made clear, however, that the President's announcement was nothing more than a publicity stunt. Nonetheless, the Egyptian judiciary seized on the President's announcement as justification for its decision to launch an ambitious election monitoring program, which included placing monitors at each of the country's 15,000+ polling stations.

While the monitor did ensure that no fraud occurred at the polling stations, the government's control of the ballot counting process enabled it to produce results that it found amenable. Still, the results were surprising. Less than 40% of the government's official candidates won their races. Another 40% went to candidates from the ruling party who failed to gain official backing and ran as independents. The secular opposition disgraced itself by winning only 3.5% of the races. The Muslim Brotherhood, which operated without official party status also won 3.5% even though it put up candidates in only 10% of the races. The remainder of seats went to independents.

The significance of the 2000 is hard to place. Angered at the results, Mubarak immediately moved to crush the judiciary's autonomy so that it would never pull a similar stunt again. While it is hard to know how much the regime managed to influence the final results, it seems clear that the Islamist opposition would not dominate at the polls if given the chance. On the other hand, there is no true democratic force that has the potential to prevail either.

Brownlee concludes that American influence is the best hope for Egyptian democracy. In addition to $2 billion in annual aid, the US has played a critical role in securing multilateral loans for Egypt as well as granting it an extra $2 billion to compensate for tourism revenue lost after September 11th. As Powell's words indicate, however, the US is not interested in taking advantage of the influence it has to promote democratization, even though there is no danger of an Islamic revolution.

So far, the most that the Bush administration has done is announce that it will limit aid to $2 billion per year if Egypt's human rights record does not improve. As I see it, that doesn't exactly seem like much of a threat. The administration must recognize that there can be no final victory in the war on terror until the governments of the Middle East rests on the consent of the governed, rather than the same brute force which gives terrorists their influence.

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