OxBlog

Thursday, January 15, 2004

# Posted 11:12 PM by Ariel David Adesnik  

REMARKABLE: Instapundit has posted the money grafs from a long report on Iraq by Expert #1 Ken Pollack. As the money grafs show, Pollack is a cautious optimist who believes that serious American planning can ensure the success of the reconstruction effort. But you really have to go through all of Pollack's report to get a sense of how dramatically different his view of Iraq is from the one provided by the daily papers.

Pollack begins his review of the situation in Iraq by saying that
It is useful and important to start with some of the most important positives in Iraq, both because too often they have been overlooked in the American media coverage, and because they point to the opportunity that we have there.
Coming from a mild-mannered, conflict-averse guy like Pollack, that kind of indictment of the media is very, very significant. (And, yes, OxBlog is enjoying its vindication very much.) The first point that Pollack takes up is Iraqi public opinion. As most observers report, the people of Iraq fear an American withdrawal far more than they resent the American presence. Next, Pollack takes a look at the insurgency and writes that
In short, [these] are not determined attacks by insurgents willing to die for their cause -- nor are they always very skillfully conducted. The attackers generally place a premium on their survival, not on killing Americans. As a result, most of the attacks do little damage, and the United States continues to suffer only an average of about 1-2 dead per day. As one sergeant who had fought in Vietnam put it to me, "if this were the Viet Cong, we'd have a hundred dead per day."

For this reason, there is a widespread sense that most of the insurgents are motivated primarily by money. While he was on the loose, Saddam reportedly paid $250 for killing an American. Consequently, his loyalists -- who never evinced much willingness to die for him while he ruled -- were willing to conduct large numbers of rather paltry attacks in the hope that they might get lucky and kill one or more Americans, rather than stand and fight (especially against U.S. firepower) and risk being killed, even though by doing so they would have a much greater likelihood of killing Americans.
What happened to all those reports in the WaPo and NYT that the sophistication of the insurgents' attacks was constantly increasing throughout the summer and fall? Well, either the Ba'athists were so incompetent to begin with that they are still incompetent despite marked improvement. Or the media decided that this was a quagmire even though it didn't have the evidence to back its opinion up.

After the insurgents, Pollack turns to the competence of American reconstruction personnel. He writes that
it is important to mention the numerous successes enjoyed by U.S. military and (to a lesser extent) civilian personnel throughout Iraq. American military civil affairs personnel, U.S. AID and State Department officials, contractors, and members of non-governmental organizations have spread out into many Iraqi villages and neighborhoods. In virtually every case, their presence has proven to have had something of the Midas touch...

These personnel acknowledge that they have made mistakes. They were sent in, in most cases, with very little understanding of Iraq or its needs, and little guidance on what to do or how to do it. They have made things up as they have gone along. One U.S. military civil affairs officer estimated that no more than a simple majority of his team's decisions were good ones, but over time, they had corrected their mistakes, continued their successes, and won the trust and gratitude of the Iraqis that they worked with.
This assessment meshes well with that of NYT correspondent Eric Schmitt, whose reports on the adaptability of American soldiers and their high morale almost seem designed to expose just how wrong the rest of the NYT staff (except John Burns) has gotten the story. It also does a good job of making the point that Americans can do a lot of good work despite their lack of expertise in the local language and culture. Why? Because winning hearts and minds depends on our democratic values, not our ability to speak Arabic.

So what about the problems? In the field of security, the number one issue is crime. While it's hard to come by any quantitative measures of the problem,
A poll conducted in early October by the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic Studies under the auspices of the International Republican Institute found that 60 percent of Iraqis felt "not very safe" or "not safe at all" in their neighborhoods, and virtually the same percentage had either "not very" [sic] or "no" confidence that coalition forces would make their cities safe. Only a little more than a quarter of those surveyed felt "very safe."5
Pollack's controversial suggestion for correcting this situation is to have American soldiers spend a lot more time on
foot patrols backed by helicopters and/or vehicles that the British Army learned to use in Northern Ireland, and that all NATO forces eventually employed in the Balkans. This is the only way that American forces can get out, reassure the Iraqi civilians, find out from them where the troublemakers are, and respond to their problems.
This means risking higher casualties, but Pollack believes there is no other way to get the job done. While I am inclined to agree, Pollack might have considered the political dynamics at play. Both the media and much of the American public become alarmed every time the American body count accelerates. The more alarmed the media and the public get, the harder it is for the administration to fund the occupation and provide manpower. While the Democrats on Capitol Hill seem to believe that the occupation must be done right, Bush's main concern in the coming months will be his re-election. And there is no reason to expect Howard Dean or any other candidate not to take advantage of public alarm. Thus, the safest bet for the administration is to keep the casualty count lay and deal with problems in Iraq after the election.

In the long-term, providing public security will be something that the Iraqis have to do for themsleves. Thus, in theory, "Iraqification" is good idea. But as Pollack argues, it is premature. The mad rush to train Iraqi security forces -- army, police, border guards etc. -- has resulted in shoddy training that turns incompetent and often ruthless men out onto the streets with the authority to abuse others. As they did in the days of Saddam, some policemen are once again resorting to extortion, rape, kidnapping and even murder. Pollack reports that
The problem is so bad that three different CPA officials told me that if they were out alone outside the Green Zone (admittedly a rare experience for many American officials) and they were flagged down by an Iraqi police officer, they probably would not stop because they would be too frightened of what he might do.
At the same time, too many Iraqis are becoming frightened of American troops because of anti-insurgent raids that humiliate many innocent homeowners. Again, Pollack suggests that the solution is to worry less about casualties and more about hearts and minds.

To be continued...
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