# Posted 11:35 PM by Ariel David Adesnik  

CAN YOU WIN THE BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS BUT STILL LOSE THE WAR? In 2006, the conventional wisdom about Afghanistan became increasingly pessimistic. Once considered a moderate success story, it was becoming a demonstration of the United States ability to defeat any sort of determined insurgents. In a recent dispatch from Afghanistan [TNR -- subscription only], Peter Bergen describes 2006 in numbers:

The day I arrived in Kabul, a suicide bomber detonated his bomb near the Afghan parliament, killing himself and two bystanders. It was the third suicide attack in Kabul in as many weeks. In 2006, suicide attacks in Afghanistan quintupled to 139; IED attacks doubled; attacks on international forces tripled; 700 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the insurgents; U.S. and NATO military deaths were at their highest levels since the Taliban was ousted; and Western forces continued to mistakenly kill local civilians.

The optimist might say that those numbers demonstrate what a paradise Afghanistan is compared to Iraq. It takes a few weeks, not a year, for 700 Iraqi civilians to be killed by Sunni bombers and Shi'ite death squads. If the US could keep Iraq at a low boil with 15,000 troops instead of ten times that number, we would be overjoyed. But the trend remains disturbing nonetheless.

Even so, I haven't touched on the real fodder for optimists: the public opinion figures for Afghanistan. Bergen reports that:

Strangely, despite all the problems facing their country, Afghans remain decisively upbeat about both their government and the presence of international forces. According to a countrywide poll conducted by ABC News and the BBC late last year, President Karzai enjoys an approval rating of 68 percent, while 88 percent say they are happy the United States invaded, 74 percent hold a favorable opinion of America, and 80 percent say they want foreign troops to remain.

Other than a failure of polling methodology, what could explain such an outcome? Shouldn't the residents of an occupied, war-torn country hate their invaders?

Several hypotheses can be easily dismissed, I think. First, one might say that the US has simply done a better job of fighting the war in Afghanistan. But I'm not aware of any significant differences in how we've approached the Taliban insurgents as opposed to their counterparts in Iraq. Another hypothesis is that the United States overthrew a much more hated regime in Afghanistan than it did in Iraq. But if anything, one could argue that the Taliban had broader public support. Alternately, one could hypothesize that ethnic and sectarian conflicts are less intense in Afghanistan than they are in Iraq. Yet ethnicity and religion brought more than a decade of brutal war to Afghanistan. Next, one might speculate that Afghans are simply more welcoming of outside intervention in its politics. Yet Afghanistan had long been known as the graveyard of empire, not least because of the defeat its warriors inflicted on the Soviets.

So then, what factors could be responsible for these different outcomes? One clear distinction between the two wars is that there was a multilateral consensus behind the invasion of Afghanistan, but not behind the invasion of Iraq. By extension, there is a multilateral presence now in Afghanistan, but only American and a handful of other military personnel in Iraq. But what evidence do we have that this has affected the course of the insurgency? In Iraq, the Shi'ites remain convinced that getting rid of Saddam was for the best. And it doesn't seem that the Sunnis would have been any more welcoming of a more multilateral occupation. After all, UN headquarters in Iraq was one of the insurgents' first major targets.

If one is looking for differences, one factor I would suggest is geography. Iraq is in the heart of the Arab world. Afghanistan is on its periphery. Even though Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan until 9/11, it is a movement born of the Arab world. I'd appreciate your thoughts on that hypothesis, since it is hardly air-tight. For example, in one important respect, geography favors the Afghan insurgents. As Prof. Porter has often observed, cross-border sanctuaries tend to be critical to the success of any insurgency. In that regard, the Pakistani frontier is far better than what the insurgents have in Iraq.

But before we get carried away with asking why, relatively speaking, the situation is better in Afghanistan, it is worth revisiting the issue of how much worse the situation in Afghanistan will get. As the title of this post asks, can you win the battle for hearts and minds but still lose the war? Can the Taliban continue to surge in spite of widespread support for the Karzai government and its American support? We often hear in this country that there is no such thing as a military solution to a guerrilla/civil war. In the end, it comes down to politics. Perhaps the Taliban have failed to learn this lesson, and thus their success will only be ephemeral? Or will the Taliban demonstrate that the iron law of counterinsurgency -- that the support of the population is everything -- may not apply in certain situations?

Heck if I know. What do you think?

Labels: Afghanistan

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