Friday, June 30, 2006
# Posted 12:20 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
If you've already read the book, I don't need to tell you much about it. But for those of you who may be holding out on the same grounds that I did, let me try and persuade you to drink the Kool Aid.
The Da Vinci Code achieves that which all great teachers strive for. It reveals the significance that esoteric knowledge has for our everyday lives. It demonstrates how thinking can be the best entertainment of all.
And I think that the book's author is fully aware that this is his mission. In one memorable scene, protagonist and Harvard professor Robert Langdon teaches a class to foul-mouthed inmates at a Massachusetts prison. Slowly, Langdon wins them over by exposing the religious significance of their own coarse language. "Horny"? Let's talk about early Christian images of the devil.
Now, unless you happen to be some sort of extraordinary polymath, you will begin to wonder how much of the esoteric knowledge in this book is a complete fabrication. For all I know, being "horny" has nothing to do with the devil. But I know for a fact that much of the most fascinating material in the book is true. (Well, not the crazy stuff about Jesus having kids, but the rest of it.)
If it weren't 1 AM right now, I would describe in greater detail the ingenious way in which DaVinci author Dan Brown integrates such material into the plot. For example, one of the first clues to the identity of the book's shadowy villain is a series of apparently random numbers that turns out to be the Fibonacci sequence.
This sequence generates the irrational number known as Phi, which none other than Leonardo DaVinci used to determine the proportions of his famous sketch of the human body known as the Vitruvian Man. (You know what I'm talking about. The naked, spread-eagled guy who looks like he has four arms and four legs.)
Slowly, what begins to emerge from the book is an amazing web of knowledge spun from the realms of history, religion, physics, mathematics, painting and sculpture. Whereas modern scholars divide knowledge into artificial bodies known as disciplines, DaVinci tears down those walls and gives you a chance to experience all of these disparate fields of knowledge as a unified whole -- as you might have experienced them in the days of Leonardo DaVinci. (13) opinions -- Add your opinion
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
# Posted 11:41 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Mainstream reporters, despite their generally liberal temperaments, have an odd sort of contempt for actual liberal politicians, who they widely view as being wimpy, pandering, fence-sitting, poll-driven wonks who are hesitant to really speak their minds and insist on giving lots of boring policy-oriented speeches that don't make good copy.Don't look at me. I didn't write that. Also plenty of substantive posts from Kevin about terrorist finance and European law, the gender gap in education, and Harvard basketball. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 11:27 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 11:03 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Barnes' makes certain points that I certainly hadn't come across before (although my knowledge of the subject is sparse). For example, the supposedly damning video of the local residents' bodies was provided not by a journalism student, but rather by a Sunni "human rights activist" with questionable credentials.
There are two points, however, that Barnes doesn't address that I would very much like to know more about. First of all, the alleged cover-up. As I understand it, the original report provided by the Marines described all of the casualties as the result of an explosion, not gunfire, which turned out to be false.
If certain Marines consciously lied about what happened in Haditha, then it's not hard to understand why so many observers have such strong suspicions about war crimes.
Second of all, Barnes doesn't talk about the fact that the residents seem to have died as a result of gunfire at close range. My memory of this is a bit foggy, so clarifications (and links) would be appreciated below.
On the one hand, gunshot wounds are consistent with the Marines' revised account of close-quarters combat. But I also have vague recollections of hearing that the wounds were closer to being the result of execution-style gunfire, rather than armed combat.
I guess the real moral of this story is that I should pay closer attention to what I read. But that's what so great about blogging -- you can admit what you don't know and pool the knowledge of others instead. (5) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 6:59 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 6:45 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
I know very little about constitutional law, but Feinstein's two main arguments are as follows: First, flag-burning is not a form of speech but a form of conduct. Second, the flag is a national monument and can be protected in the same manner as one would the Lincoln Memorial.
Perhaps there is a legal basis for that first argument, but it seems like wordplay to me. After all, can Congress outlaw mimes just because they annoy us with their conduct rather than their speech?
As for the flag being a monument, that seems like nonsense. If you build a miniature version of the Lincoln Monument and smash it up with a sledgehammer, that is perfectly legal. In other words, a monument is a specific piece of public property, such as the actual, physical Lincoln Monument a couple of miles from where I'm sitting right now in Washington.
On a related note, riddle me this: Why did Hillary vote against the flag-burning amendment after sponsoring a bill to outlaw flag-burning? (15) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 6:19 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Which leads me to think that the recent flurry of articles about Kos is, unfortunately, good for the man rather than bad. This week, Newsweek has what CJR Daily describes as a three-page long "provocative takedown" of Kos.
Actually, I'd say the article is pretty tame. It suggests Kos suffers from a bit of "paranoia" -- You don't say! -- but makes no effort to paint him as a far-left ideologue. More importantly, the article leads off with a description of how incredibly important Kos is:
Every major media outlet in the country had attended [Kos' first annual] conference, detailing the spectacle of Democratic bigwigs (including the party's Senate minority leader and four of its leading 2008 presidential aspirants) embracing Moulitsas as the guru of an activist movement they were eager to exploit.For an outright negative take on Kos, you can read David Brooks' recent column [not free] about him. Brooks' basic point is that if you hire Kos as a political consultant, he'll endorse you on his blog even if he already declared his support for your opponent. In other words, Kos is for sale.
Is Brooks right? In some respects, it doesn't matter. The real import of his column is that Kos is important enough to become the subject of a personal attack by the NYT's in-house conservative.
Actually, I don't know if Brooks is right. If you want to find out, Glenn has some links to those who think Brooks got his facts wrong. Feel free to read up and report your findings below.
But remember, talking about Kos is good for him. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
# Posted 12:21 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
FEINGOLD: Having a public deadline that the American people could see, that the Iraqi people could see, that the world could see, so that people couldn’t use the idea of a so-called “American occupation of Iraq” as an excuse to recruit terrorists, that would be good for us, it would help us in the fight against al-Qaeda, which should be our top goal, Tim, fighting al-Qaeda and its affiliates, not being bogged down in Iraq.On the one hand Feingold is hawkish, refusing to acknowledge that the occupation of Iraq deserves to be called, well, an occupation. But then he turns right around and says we should only be fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as if he never heard of an organization called "Al Qaeda in Iraq". (You know which one I mean. It's leader is that Zarqawi guy.)
MR. RUSSERT: ...Are you concerned, as is Senator Clinton, that if we pulled out of Iraq completely by the end of next year, and it did tip into total chaos and become a haven for terrorists or for al-Qaeda, it would be a major threat to the United States?There is a strange parallelism here. Just as certain hawks assumed that everything in Iraq would improve dramatically after an invasion, certain doves have persuaded themselves that nothing all that bad will happen if America pulls out.
MR. RUSSERT: Back in 2002 and 2003, you voted against the war, as I said, one of a handful of senators who did. But you did say that Saddam possessed weapons that were capable of unimaginable destruction. That you believed in regime change, that he had biological, chemical and potentially nuclear weapons, that he’s a dangerous and brutal person, and you agreed with the president on that. Why were you so wrong about that description of Saddam?None of it was wrong? None of it? Imagine what kind of trouble Dick Cheney would get in for saying something like that. But the real issue here is that Feingold just can't admit his arguments have any flaws. Might things in Iraq get much worse if we leave? No, of course not. Was anything you said before the invasion wrong? No, of course not.
MR. RUSSERT: You [said] in GQ magazine that’s coming out this week, “Problem is, George Bush has committed a more clearly impeachable offense than Clinton or even Nixon ever did.” George Bush committed a more impeachable offense than Richard Nixon?Thomas Jefferson wouldn't have cared about the use of executive power in an attempt to influence the outcome of an election. I beg to differ. If John Adams had tried that in 1800, I don't think TJ would've taken it lying down.
But if one assumes that George W. Bush is the bogeyman Russ Feingold makes him out to be...
MR. RUSSERT: So, logically, you’re suggesting that George Bush deserves impeachment?Monarchical. A threat to the republic. But it would be "disruptive" to actually confront this threat and save the republic?
MR. RUSSERT: Should we end this wiretapping program until it is approved by a court?Wait. So Feingold won't even oppose the continuation of the selfsame action whose justification by the president (via reference to Article II) is an impeachable offense?
I guess I'll just have to say that Feingold is a very, very, very independent thinker. (9) opinions -- Add your opinion
Monday, June 26, 2006
# Posted 11:59 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Before I get to the grades, let me just observe how incredibly annoying it is for all three shows to grauitiously describe their interviews as "exclusive". Meet the Press even had the chutzpah to describe its interview with Feingold as exclusive, when the fact is that Feingold should have to pay for that kind of air time. Apparently, the only real meaning of exclusive is that the guest won't also be on one of the other talk shows that same morning. But anyhow, here we go:
Feingold: C-. His manner and tone of voice are excellent. He sounds confident and well-informed, yet still friendly and approachable. But then he wandered off into cloud-cuckooland. How can anyone possibly insist that Bush is worse criminal than Nixon AND that he shouldn't be impeached?And the hosts:
Russert: B-. Feingold is like fish in barrel. Russert should filleted him.Hasta el proximo Domingo! (0) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 1:29 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Sunday, June 25, 2006
# Posted 11:37 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Although hindsight is often profoundly flawed, it nonetheless tends to result in realizations that are nothing less than startling. The invasion of Iraq went forward about a year after Max Boot published The Savage Wars of Peace. It is a book about America's "small wars", defined not so much by their size as by the absence of organized forces confronting one another on a conventional battlefield.
In small wars, soldiers fight along side guerillas, propagandists, policemen and politicians. Decisive battles are rare. Even the outcome of the war itself may not be known until well after it is over. Clearly, the occupation of Iraq belongs to the United States' 200-year old tradition of engaging in "small" or irregular conflicts.
Even in 2002, Boot's prescience was fairly self-evident. In the preface, Boot asks,
What lessons might these small of the past teach us about small wars in the future? In the late 1990s -- the decade of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo -- I was intrigued by these recurring conflicts and hoped to read a book to answer that question. Not finding one, I decided to write it myself.Before the book was published, the United States found itself in another small war in Afghanistan, except the stakes involved were anything but small. And after the book came out, there was Iraq.
In April 1914, Woodrow Wilson ordered the US Navy to occupy the Mexican port of Veracruz. Wilson did not have permission from Congress, but felt it necessary to overthrow Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta sooner rather than later. Even though international law clearly prohibited such a policy of regime change, Wilson expected liberation to popular south of the border. Boot writes that:
Wilson had counted on a peaceful occupation; he assumed that the Mexcian people -- "the submerged 85 per cent of the people of that Republic who are now struggling toward liberty" -- would welcome American intervention to topple their dictator. This view turned out to be dangerously naive. (p.151)The parallel to Iraq is obvious, but its significance may not be so apparent. Is the lesson here that naively idealistic presidents stumble into dangerous and bloody wars? And that this president would have known better if he had studied more history?
Or is the lesson that even a population that broadly welcomes a change of regime may have within it enough defenders of the status quo to complicate the task of the liberator? The 85% figure mentioned by Wilson is an interesting one. In Iraq, the Kurds and Shi'ites comprise about 80% of the population. And yet that has clearly not been enough to ensure a smooth occupation.
My purpose here is not to suggest that one of these interpretations is right and one of them wrong. Rather, it is to argue that the careful study of events such as the US intervention in the Mexican civil war might allow to have a much more sophisticated and practical debate about the perils of occupation.
Although Boot only devotes a few pages to the occupation of Veracruz and related events, some of the details are eerily reminiscient of events ninety years later in Iraq. For example, one of the great challenges of the occupation has been to facilitate the establishment of legitimate local governments in insurgent held areas. Ninety years ago,
An [American] messenger discovered the mayor of Veracruz cowering in his bathroom, but the mayor said he had no authority over his armed countrymen.I think many Iraqis mayors would empathize with his plight.
One of the great challenges that America faces in terms of learning such lessons is that its small wars barely register in the national consciousness. Most adults can tell you a few things about World War II and the Civil War, or even Korea. They know World War I happened and that it happened before World War II. They probably remember the first Gulf War.
But who knows anything about US involvement in Tripoli, Tunisia, Nicaragua the Philippines or imperial China? There is one small war that every American knows about, however: Vietnam. As Boot observers (p.287), the war in Vietnam was anything but small, although its style was much more reminiscent of the conflicts in Nicaragua and the Philippines than of World War II.
Nonetheless, Boot says, the US Army tried to fight the Vietcong the same way it had fought the Wehrmacht. Drawing on the seminal work of Col. (Ret.) Andrew Krepinevich, Boot argues that the US Army brass was conceptually incapable of recognizing that not all wars are about technology and firepower.
In contrast, the Marines understood the difference thanks to their experience -- and frequent success -- in fighting small wars. But the Army lacked that experience and refused to learn either from the Marines or from British military advisers who sought to share their own experiences.
Of course, there is considerable disagreement about how America should've fought in Vietnam or if it should've fought at all. My purpose here is not to take sides in that debate, although I think my position is clear. Rather, my purpose is to point that there is latent potential for a broader understanding of small wars if the American public can overcome its visceral aversion to the tragedy of Vietnam and instead come to see it as a bloody but instructive experience.
It may take a generation before that kind of change sets in. In the short term, the issue of vital importance may be whether or not the US Army can assimilate the lessons of America's small wars in time to apply their lessons to Iraq. And there are some promising signs in that direction. For example, Lt. Col. John Nagl's book on the lessons of Vietnam has been embraced by the Army's top generals. Like Boot, Nagl draws extensively on the work of Krepinevich and shares his interpretation of the war.
The foreword to the second edition of Nagl's book was written by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff (it's top general). In March, the Wall Street Journal [no link] reported that the first thing US commander Gen. George Casey did after Donald Rumsfeld landed in Iraq was to give him a copy of Nagl's book.
Yet as any college professor knows, distributing material to be read is not the same as having it read. As Boot recounts (p.294), Gen. William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had a copy on his nighttable of Mao Zedong's classic text on guerrilla warfare. However, Gen. Westmoreland was too busy fighting his war to read much of the book.
With any luck, books such as The Savage Wars of Peace will help ensure that when the United States finds itself inevitably involved in another small war, its leaders know how to win it. (6) opinions -- Add your opinion
Friday, June 23, 2006
# Posted 9:06 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
DISREGARD THE FOLLOWING POST: It is about a quiz that compares quotes from Ann Coulter to doctored quotes from Adolf Hitler. Except some versions of the quiz (including the one I took) don't let you know the quotes were doctored. Many thanks to Blar for bringing this to my attention. Someone should bring it to Matt's attention as well.
ANN COULTER & ADOLF HITLER: CAN YOU TELL THE DIFFERENCE? This clever quiz lists 14 quotes and asks you to identify whether they belong to Coulter or Hitler. After Matt Yglesias announced that he got 12 out of 14 correct, I had to try it. Sadly, I only got 9. Moreover, it took me a while to decide on my answers.
Interestingly, of the 5 answers I got wrong, 4 were Hitler quotes I attributed Coulter. Only 1 was a Coulter quote I attributed to Hitler. That may be just chance. Or it may indicate that almost nothing Coulter said was so horrible that I was inclined to attribute it to Hitler, rather than my fellow American.
In contrast, it would seem that I have such a low opinion of Coulter (none of whose books I read) that I attributed four of Hitler's sayings to her. Maybe she isn't as crazy as I thought. Either that, or the quotes themselves aren't that bad, so I figured they weren't Hitler's.
FYI, none of the quotes has anything racist or anti-Semitic in it. If you didn't know that half of them were from Hitler and someone just asked you "Who said it?", Hitler probably wouldn't even make your top five.
Anyhow, if you have a minute, why not take the quiz and report your score below, along with your political affiliation and whether or not you've read any of Coulter's books.
UPDATE: Some of Matt's readers are reporting their scores, too. One even has a very simple and effective trick of figuring out the answers. Most of Matt's readers are making nasty remarks at Coulter's expense. Some go far enough to demonstrate that Coulterism is alive and well on the left. (12) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 7:32 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
I think that's an incredibly bad idea. Perry and Carter discount the possibility of North Korea responding with a full-scale attack against South Korea and Japan, but I am not persuaded by their argument:
North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to act on that threat. Why attack South Korea, which has been working to improve North-South relations (sometimes at odds with the United States) and which was openly opposing the U.S. action? An invasion of South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong Il's regime within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows.Let's remember that "bloody" means tens, possibly hundreds of thousands of dead South Koreans, as well as thousands of American soldiers. And this is assuming that the war goes well (even though most of our ground forces are busy in Iraq or recovering from their deployments).
But more importantly, what about North Korea's other options for retaliation? It could launch a few missiles directed at Tokyo or Seoul, killing thousands. It could even use standard artillery to kill as many people in Seoul as it wanted. Worst of all, it may decide to share some of its uranium or plutonium with other US adversaries.
I guess the one silver lining in this debate is that certain liberals are willing to take such outlandish options quite seriously when proposed by leading Democrats. Although concerned, Matt Yglesias writes that:
One shouldn't dismiss [Perry & Carter] out of hand as know-nothings. Indeed, they know a great deal more about this than I do.Josh Marshall is also wary, writing that:
Bill Perry isn't some nut. Far from it. He was Bill Clinton's second defense secretary. He's a very shrewd, level-headed guy. And he's been deeply involved in the North Korea issue for years.So let's read between the lines. Yglesias and Marshall are saying that the ideas proposed by Carter and Perry sound like those of a "know-nothing" or a "nut". In other words, if Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had proposed an attack on North Korea, it would be safe to dismiss them as know-nothings or nuts. But Carter and Perry are good guys, so no criticism from Matt and Josh.
Well, as far as I'm concerned, this idea is simply nuts. Any Democrats who condemns Bush for invading Iraq without considering the possible consequences should condemn Perry and Carter for being at least that reckless. (13) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 7:22 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Thursday, June 22, 2006
# Posted 12:03 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
# Posted 11:54 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 10:56 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Thus, it came as great relief to me yesterday morning when I encountered a true-to-life advocate of pathological multilateralism. And it wasn't just some random schmuck. It was the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whom I once served as a lowly peon.
Even a glance at Dr. Mathews' biography is enough to know that she has a powerful intellect and tremendous record of accomplishment. I happened to run across Dr. Mathews yesterday morning, when she delivered some opening remarks at a conference for young professionals in the field of foreign affairs.
Just as Bernard Lewis turned to the past to explain what went wrong in the modern Middle East, Mathews turned to the past to explain what wrong with American foreign policy. Her answer is that it fell prey to pathological unilateralism.
As she recounted, the great tragedy of the 1990s entailed America's failure to sign a great host of important international treaties, such as the Kyoto protocol, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the anti-landmine accord and the charter of the International Criminal Court. As Mathews candidly observed, it was the Clinton administration that set the United States on a dangerously unilateral course.
I have a different candidate for the great tragedy of the 1990s: Rwanda. Followed by Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti. In my mind, there was a total disconnect between Mathews hopeful commitment to multilateral instruments and the brutal reality of the real challenges to democracy and human rights in the post-Cold War era.
According to Mathews, the wisest end to which the United States can direct its great power is the forging of an international order based on cooperation and law. Not surprisingly, Mathews had very little to say about the profound flaws of institutions such as the United Nations that nominally exist to promote cooperation and law.
According to Robert Kagan, also an employee of Dr. Mathews (as well as my old boss at Carnegie), Europeans tend to be "principled multilateralists" in the sense that they see the United Nations as the legitimate arbiter of international affairs. In contrast, even most Democrats in the United States are "instrumental multilateralists" who prefer to have UN support but ultimately believe that acting in accordance with American values is more important than UN approval. On this subject, Mathews sides with the Europeans.
When listening to advocates of this sort of multilateralism, critics such as myself tend to watch for indications of the advocate's naivete, since we quietly suspect that such intelligent individuals could only maintain their faith in the UN and international law by closing their eyes to its flaws. As it turned out, Mathews delivered.
In her introduction of keynote speaker Robert Gallucci, Mathews described the United States' 1994 nuclear accord with North Korea as "the signature diplomatic achievement of the Clinton administration". Yes, that accord. Yes, that North Korea. The one that did so much to vindicate the hawkish article of faith that you simply can't trust extremist dictatorships to abide by their commitments.
Although currently the dean of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, Gallucci is also the former State Deparmtent official who negotiated the 1994 accord with the North Koreans. He is not a naive man. In his keynote address, he spoke very frankly about the tremendous threat presented by a nuclear North Korea and a soon-to-be nuclear Iran.
But when it came time for Q&A, I was in a feisty mood. This was supposed to be a non-partisan conference for young professionals, not a chance for Dr. Mathews to preach the gospel of multilateralism. So I decided to throw an elbow in the speakers' ribs.
During my turn at the microphone, I began by observing that Dr. Mathews' praise of the 1994 accord as the previous administration's signature diplomatic achievements may have struck some of us in the audience as "an effort to damn the Clinton administration with very faint praise."
I said I appreciated how hard it is to negotiate with the North Koreans and how much Dean Gallucci accomplished in that regard, but based on his experience, is there any hope now that we can have more than paper agreements with the North Koreans?
Gallucci was not amused. He said that the phrase "paper agreements" is evidence of very shallow thinking on the part of critics. After all, what are treaties supposed to be written on other than paper? Those who insist the use of this derisive phrase tend to be those who just don't understand that diplomacy is necessary.
But that was just the beginning. At one point, Gallucci paraphrased part of my statement and then dismissed it as "crap". Really. He then came up with a very artful excuse for the North Koreans' secret violation of the 1994 accord. He said they anticipated that the next administration might have very little appreciation for diplomacy, so it would be best to hedge their bets.
Wow. I guess that means any treaty signed with a Democratic administration isn't worth much, because the other party might have to pre-emptively violate it if they anticipate a Republican victory in the next election.
Anyhow, I don't hold it against Gallucci that he got rough with me. I was the one who departed from the civil conventions of the foreign policy establishment in order to foster provocative debate.
Now, I ought to mention that before asking my question, I intentionally decided not to state my name for the record. I wanted the speakers to remember my question, not who asked it. But Washington is not a very big place, and I wouldn't be displeased if either Dr. Mathews or Dean Galluci stumbled across this post. If they have any responses to this post, I would be glad to republish them verbatim.
The blogosphere has a charming habit of forcing august personages to engage the arguments of grenade-tossing upstarts. I like that. (12) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
# Posted 11:18 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
This isn’t a leftist movement...We have people on the left, the center, the right and everything in between and up and down the party spectrum.Surprisingly, Ryan Lizza's superb article about YearlyKos takes Moulitsas at his word. Lizza writes that:
The most passionate conversations in the small knots of activists I interview is over whether to follow the lead of blogfather Moulitsas and define the nascent online activist movement as strictly a machine that helps Democrats win or to create one that is more ideologically pure and presses for a set of specific principles.Kos may not spend his time composing manifestos, and there may be real tension between "partisans" and "ideologues" as Lizza describes them, but it's pretty hard to miss Kos' general ideological orientation. Matt Continetti drives this point home with a short list of extreme observations by Kos & Co.:
I wish there footnotes in the Weekly Standard, because I can hardly believe that either Kos or Hackett said something that dumb and offensive. Talk about accusations of being unpatriotic.
For a more detailed explication and takedown of the Kos ideology, Peter Beinart's recent columns in TNR [or subscribers] are the place to go. Beinart explains in a two-part series that Kos & Co. have mounted a full-scale assault on both the substantive and partisan political merits of the Clinton legacy. According to Kos, "Clinton's third way failed miserably. It ... delivered nothing." Well, perhaps Kos should ask whether a second-term for Bush Sr. followed by Quayle presidency is what he would've preferred. C'est la vie. (8) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 10:53 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Politicians, journalists and bloggers all derive a very significant measure of credibility from denigrating their counterparts, while at the same time craving their approval. I'd venture that the same holds true on the conservative side of the blogosphere, albeit with somewhat less intensity.
At times, the contradiction between resentment and adulation express itself as a rather surreal sort of hypocrisy. Lizza writes that:
Well, Mandalay Bay is pretty damn swank, so I might compromise my principles there, too.
Looking forward to 2008, the most interesting aspect of Lizza's article is its portrayal of the inherent tensions in Mark Warner's efforts to court the blogs while protecting his centrist credentials. Warner employs Kos' associate Jerome Armstrong as a consultant and hosted a $50,000 bash for the participants at YearlyKos. Warner also directed some fulsome praise in the participants' direction:
Warner grabs [the musicians'] microphone. "This is the new public square!" he shouts. "This is the new face of democracy and the new face of the Democratic Party!"Only can only pray it isn't so. And maybe it isn't:
It's looks like things will only get hotter from here on in. (1) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 12:12 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
I haven't gotten through all of it yet, but most of the focus is on the recent YearlyKos convention in Las Vegas. TNR also published a nasty hatchet job targeted at Glenn Reynolds. The quality was so low it was really beneath them.
On a related note, don't forget to keep up with the latest scandal over at Kos, covered by my fellow Manhattanite, Garance Franke-Ruta. (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 12:02 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Author Enrique Krauze suggests that there is a disturbing authoritarian undercurrent to Lopez's brand of populism. But I also agree that with Krauze that Mexican civil society is strong enough to handle a disputatious president.
What Krauze doesn't mention is the almost inevitable diplomatic imbroglios that will result from a Lopez presidency. Presumably, he will say nice things first about Chavez, then about Castro, all the while denouncing George W. Bush to score points at home. But my sense of Lopez is that he won't have much more to offer than bluster, so there's no need to take him as seriously as one would a real semi-dictator like Chavez. (6) opinions -- Add your opinion
Monday, June 19, 2006
# Posted 10:54 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
In the previous issue of the Weekly Standard, Michael has some very unkind things to say about the President:
His administration charts the path of least resistance and paper compromise so dominant during the Clinton years...The Central Intelligence Agency now estimates North Korea has a couple of bombs; the Stalinist state claims to have more. The idea that Clinton's deal [in 1994] was a success is revisionist nonsense. It is a model only for the triumph of appearance over substance. Kim Jong Il played Clinton; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is playing Bush.So what should the President do, with American forces already overcommitted in Iraq and Iranian facilities only partially vulnerable to US airstrikes? Michael doesn't say. Although one might criticize the administration for expecting too much from multilateral diplomacy, it seems thoroughly premature to denounce Bush the younger for going wobby.
With regard to North Korea, we are also relatively short on options. Which means that Clinton may simply have been doing the best he could in a bad situation, rather than expressing his pathological liberalism by cutting a deal with the Kims.
From where I stand, the real value-added of Michael's article is its treatment of Somalia. Although I certainly hadn't paid much attention until now, Michael marshals some very persuasive evidence to the effect that Somalia is becoming the next pre-9/11 Afghanistand and that the US isn't doing much about it. I hope that isn't the case for long. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 10:39 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
So it turns out that Karl Rove is wrong and it's actually the GOP that is working to betray America. Look at the evidence: The GOP candidate in District 7 for the Maryland House of Delegates is none other than Nikolai Volkoff. That's a picture of him up above. Does he look like a good American to you? Hell no!
If you were a kid like me in the 1980s, you'd know that Nikolai Volkoff was one of the low-down, dirtiest wrestlers in all of professional wrestling. Along with the Iron Sheik, he resorted to countless dirty tricks in order to defeat real American heroes like Hulk Hogan. So does it surprise anyone that now he's running as a Republican?
As it turns out, Josip Nikolai Peruzovic was born in Yugoslavia in 1947. He became a member of the Yugoslav national weightlifting team and defected to Canada in 1968. Two years later he arrived in the United States. As he explains on his campaign website:
I arrived here in the states with fifty dollars in my pocket and one suit (I still have today). I was amazed of just how welcomed I was and how beautiful the USA is. I became a professional wrestler and immediately became a top draw around the world known as the "bad guy" that fans paid to see wrestle top stars such as Bruno Sammartino, Hulk Hogan, and so many more, I sold out every major arena in the world and became a household name almost over night. I portrayed a Russian sympathizer to show the world what the evils of communism meant and just how bad communism is. I was not always in agreement with such a terrible character but after speaking with my manager Freddie Blassie, I agreed to portray the evils to show what was wrong with a very depressing and disheartening government. However, I was actually living the "American Dream" while building what would be a Hall Of Fame WWE career.Nikolai's campaign slogan is "An American Dream for Everyone". His website doesn't provide much in the way of specifics, but you can buy a really cool autographed T-shirt for $30. If I lived in Maryland, that would be enough to get my vote. (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 8:56 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Murtha: C-. Abysmal. Clearly withdrawn from the reality-based community. His newest nonsense is to insist that we would've nailed Zarqawi even if we had already withdrawn all of our soldiers from Iraq. Why? Because we hit him with an airstrike. As for the GIs who took custody of Zarqawi after the bombing (with help from the Iraqis who supposedly hate us), Murtha doesn't say.Hmm. An usual week. It isn't often that one party scores so much higher than the other on the OxBlog round-up. But if you assume that the two American CEOs vote Republican, then I guess it balances out. As for the hosts:
Russert: B-. Either stop inviting Murtha on your show or stop him from rambling incoherently.See ya next week. (9) opinions -- Add your opinion
Friday, June 16, 2006
# Posted 7:51 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Fumento filed his dispatch from Ramadi, where he was embedded with the 1st battalion of the 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, the very same unit immortalized by Stephen Ambrose and HBO. Although Fumento (himself a vetern of the Army airborne) chose Ramadi because the combat there is the most intense, I would venture that the title of his story represents a conscious effort to cast the soldiers of this war as the descendants of those who fought in the Second World War, rather than in Vietnam.
The situation on the ground, however, is far more reminiscent of 'Nam than it is of Normandy:
Yet as Fumento himself observes, gradually killing the jihadists may take a very, very, very long time. To illustrate his point, he recounts a surreal incident in which an M-1 Abrams tank (named for the general who commanded US forces in Vietnam from 1968 on) was disabled by an IED:
You can't just abandon an Abrams, because it has unique equipment and armor. If the bad guys get hold of a single vital piece they could use it to determine ways of defeating these otherwise almost invincible behemoths. Further, they could sell the information to anybody with a vested interest in blowing up M-1s. You also can't just call in an airstrike on a tank, as is routinely done with downed aircraft. That's fine for destroying secret electronics, but blasting a tank just spreads out the parts.The image of an enemy almost immune to the human cost of the war is once again reminiscent of Vietnam. Even if we kill ten of them for every one of ours, our national will may be the first to break.
Of course Fumento hopes it won't. I hope the same. From a strategic and moral perspective, I believe that this is war we must win. Yet from the view on the ground in Ramadi, it is very hard to see how we are making much progress. (11) opinions -- Add your opinion
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
# Posted 11:46 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
In addition, the film is also extraordinarily political. In one of the most remarkable scenes I have ever witnessed, the film celebrates the death of American soldiers. The scene is a battle scene, a classic confrontation between the White Man and the Indian. I suspect it isn't the first battle scene in which the Indians have prevailed. Yet instead of an ambiguous or tragic act, the slaughter of the Americans is represented as a moral triumph.
To be more precise, there is one ex-American fighting on the Indian side, Lt. John Dunbar (Kevin Costner). Just in case the inspirational crescendos that accompanied the soldiers' deaths weren't clear enough, Dunbar announces while sitting around a fire with his comrades in arms that:
Killing the soldiers at the river was a good thing. I did not mind killing those men. I was glad to do it.Well, at least the film recognizes the importance of moral clarity. And if one interprets the characters in the film as symbols of their respective nations, then it is hard to deny that there is a certain justice to it.
Sadly, my knowledge of Western and Native American history is very limited. All I can really contribute is my awareness of my teachers' consensus that English and, later, American settlers brutally drove the Native Americans off their land in order to take it for themselves. This brutality persisted for hundreds of years, thus marking Native Americans as historic victims of White America that belong in the same category as slaves.
Naturally, I suspect that there was much greater moral complexity to those centuries of interaction than this film betrays. But that is not its purpose. This film is an apology, an expression of liberal guilt. It is the story of a White Man who discovers that the Lakota Sioux are far more noble (and environmentally friendly!) than his vicious, crude and often deranged fellow Americans.
Magically endowed with the moral sentiments of the late 20th century, Lt. Dunbar displays a remarkable sort of multicultural tolerance and curiosity. He gradually becomes a member of the tribe, thus fulfilling the historical fantasy that the White Man and the Indian could have co-existed in peace rather than waging relentless war. Ultimately, Dunbar renounces his American heritage and takes for himself the Sioux name, Dances With Wolves.
In light of how often Hollywood has reduced Native Americans to crude caricatures, I don't feel all that bad about this one chance to exact a bit of belated revenge. The issue has long been settled, so I don't consider the film to be inflammatory.
But imagine if the film had debuted this year instead of in 1990. A decade and a half ago, Americans were still living through the euphoria of impending victory in the Cold War. We were feeling generous and pacific.
But today our soldiers are dying on foreign soil. If this film had come out now, it would denounced (with considerable justification) as crude left-wing propaganda, because no film is just about history. Watching it now, I found it hard not to imagine the Sioux as a thinly veiled metaphor for every insurgent American soldiers have faced, from Vietnam to Iraq.
At the very same moment that the fictional John Dunbar was becoming a Sioux, Abraham Lincoln was fighting to save the Union and liberate its slaves. Just as we dare not forget what happened to the Native Americans, we also dare not forget that the values we fight to uphold today were the same values that great Americans have fought to uphold since 1776. (17) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 8:12 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 8:10 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 8:03 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 7:48 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
It is also...time to revisit the case for the war. Zarqawi is a perfect reminder of why we had to fight in Iraq. Would we be safer if he were living there, under Saddam's protection, securely planning attacks around the world and working on his chemical and biological weapons projects?To some, that would sound dangerously like a suggestion that there were WMD in Iraq. For a precise understanding of Kristol's point, one must turn to the latest article in the Standard from Stephen Hayes, who has argued at length that Americans continue to ignore evidence of important connections between Saddam and Al Qaeda.
In his latest, Hayes writes that:
Many journalists either don't know or choose not to report the fact that Zarqawi was in Baghdad with two dozen al Qaeda associates nearly a year before the war.Powell's presentation doesn't have much credibility left, but I was under the impression that his points about Zarqawi had not been refuted. I am also under the impression that the Senate Intel Committee's report is a trustworthy document.
But one of the great things about blogging is that I don't just have to trust my own limited memory and instincts. If any of you have information that contradicts Hayes' assertions about Zarqawi, feel free to include your links and commentary below. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 7:27 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
If I were a better man, I would not have truly celebrated the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. One might ask: Is it possible to celebrate the positive results of Zarqawi's death without rejoicing at the death itself? In an editorial for the Weekly Standard, Bill Kristol writes that:
Before considering the possible implications for the war in Iraq and the global struggle against terror, we should pause to celebrate so striking an instance of injustice avenged, and justice vindicated. The unjust--even the barbarically unjust--prevail all too often in this world. It is good for civilized people to see, as Marshall Wittmann put it, that "evil has suffered a setback."Kristol writes that we should celebrate justice, not death. That is a good message. But in this instance, it is very hard to separate the two. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, June 13, 2006
# Posted 12:36 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
Casey: B-. Softballs from Schieffer allowed Casey to be vague, which didn't reassure me in the least about the situation in Iraq.And the hosts:
Schieffer: B-. You've got to be ready when a four-star general comes on your show. You know he won't say anything overtly political, but you have an unprecedented chance to demand very specific information about what the military is actually doing in Iraq. Schieffer didn't come close.Until next week... (3) opinions -- Add your opinion
Sunday, June 11, 2006
# Posted 10:57 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
The story is written almost entirely from the parents' perspective and contains passages such as this one:
In Chevy Chase [Maryland], Sally Fogarty and her husband, parents of Gibbs Fogarty, hunkered down, avoiding social settings where the Duke case was the topic of discussion. "I could not risk hearing my friends express doubt over my son, because I was afraid the friendships would be ruined," Fogarty said.And this one:
Over the months, tensions erupted over legal strategies and fears of which son might be handcuffed next. The less-affluent parents have worried about how to pay legal bills. The wealthy ones swore they would spend every last penny clearing the names of the indicted.Theatrical language, such as being "cast" or "fashion[ing]...a persona", is often one of the best tip-offs about a correspondent's personal judgment. If the Duke players had to be "cast" as "thuggish, racist, elite jocks", that is basically they same as saying that they are not those things. If they were, then they wouldn't have to be cast.
Naturally, such an interpretation is open to the objection that it reads too much into a correspondent's choice of words. Given how fast journalists have to work to meet their deadlines, can they really pack so much intention into every one of their phrases?
My answer to that question is 'yes'. Journalists may work on tight schedules, but they develop habits that allow them to meet those schedules day after day after day. In other words, they develop conventions for the journalistic genre.
If you aren't persuaded, I just ask that you keep my hypothesis in mind and call it back into service next time you come across some evidence. For my part, I will try to point out additional instances of this phenomenon, so you don't have to put any faith in a generalization based on one or two cases.
Anyhow, I think it's remarkable how coverage of the lacrosse story has changed since it first broke. (9) opinions -- Add your opinion
Friday, June 09, 2006
# Posted 12:02 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
As it turns out, there are about 300 generals in the Army. In contrast, there are almost 4000 colonels and more than 9000 lieutenant colonels. This tells you something about just how tough it is to become a general.
In the entire US military, there are more than 200,000 officers and almost 1.2 million enlisted personnel. The officer-to-enlisted ratio is highest in the Air Force and lowest in the Marines.
1.4 million military personnel all together. We owe them a tremendous debt.
CLARIFICATION: To be precise, there are approximately 300 general officers in the Army. There are, however, only 11 Generals, often referred to as "four-star generals". The remainder are Lieutentant Generals (3 stars), Major Generals (2 stars) or Brigadier Generals (1 star). (7) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, June 06, 2006
# Posted 11:51 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
# Posted 11:30 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
[Amb.] Zalmay Khalilzad, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and now the president himself have all been touting the clear-and-hold strategy as the solution to America's woes in Iraq.That's Lawrence Kaplan writing in TNR.
In The Army and Vietnam, Krepinevich writes about the remarkable success in the early 1960s of the Marines' Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), which worked hand-in-hand with Vietnamese militia and local officials. (pp.172) Later in the war, the combined civil-military Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) program achieved many similar successes. Sadly, the Army ignored the Marines success and dismantled their program. Later, they underfunded CORDS in order to focus on massive search-and-destroy operations.
Reading Krepinevich's book is often like banging one's head against a wall. If only our generals had been a little more open-minded, Vietnam was theirs to win. Thanks to atrocities of the kind pointed out by Patrick, the Viet Cong often antagonized the population at least as much as the Americans. But they were also much better at intimidating.
One theory holds that the Viet Cong won over the population of South Vietnam by wrapping themselves in the mantle of Vietnamese nationalism. But that doesn't come across at all in Krepinevich's book, and he is hardly reluctant to identify reasons that the Army failed in Vietnam.
The flip side of the Kaplan's analogy above is that there was no equivalent to the Shi'ites in Vietnam. In other words, there was no sixty percent of the population who saw the Americans' presence as beneficial to their basic interests, regardless of the numerous complaints they had about the army of occupation.
This strikes as perhaps the most important difference between Iraq and Vietnam. Terrible as things are in Iraq, we've grounded our strategy in an approach that aligns us with the majority. If I were to point out one oversight in Krepinevich's book, it is that he never explores the strategic impact of the United States' self-defeating support for unstable military regimes in South Vietnam.
Perhaps the question didn't seem important in 1986, but what if the United States had made a real effort to promote democracy in Vietnam? What if, instead of an electoral facade, we really let the people of Vietnam choose their own government? Some might suggest Vietnam would've gone Communist. I don't believe it, but I guess we'll never know. (3) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 11:04 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Gore: B. I'm no expert on global warming, so I can only describe how Gore sounds to the layman. Very well-spoken. Remarkably well-informed. Stubborn. Naive. And a little bit kooky. He kept insisting that Manhattan might be underwater in the very near future. We just don't know. But give him points for self-awareness: he said that it might not have be a good idea to talk so much about a "planetary emergency" if you have a reputation for being an alarmist.And the hosts:
Stephanopoulos: B. He started out very strong with Gore by beating him at his own game of global warming expertise. Then he seemed to melt into admiration and get a little too excited about Gore in 2008. Here's my idea: A six-month ban on asking any Sunday morning guest about their plans for 2008. It is a complete waste of time better spent on substantive matters.See ya soon. (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
Monday, June 05, 2006
# Posted 6:46 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Anonymous Lawyer is the story of an unnamed partner at a major corporate lawfirm who takes vicious delight in tormenting absolutely everyone below him on the totem pole. Associates. Paralegals. Secretaries. Everyone.
However, the anonymous narrator just can't keep his thoughts to himself, so he begins to blog about his casual sadism at the office. The question is, can he keep his identity a secret? (No, of course not. That's what the story is about.)
In what may be a fictional first, Anonymous Lawyer tells its story almost entirely in the form of a series of blog posts, with a few e-mail exchanges thrown in. But this is only natural for a book that began its life as a blog, also entitled Anonymous Lawyer, "Stories from the trenches, by a fictional hiring partner at a large law firm in a major city".
So just how incredibly funny is this book? First of all, be warned. Blachman's sense of humor is profoundly black. On the very first page of the book, the narrator decides to identify his constantly overworked junior colleagues by a series of stabbing pseudonyms:
"The Short One, The Dumb One, The One With The Limp, The One Who's Never Getting Married, The One Who Missed Her Kid's Funeral."The word "funeral" hit me like a baseball bat to the back of the head. What did this lawyer miss? Her kid's piano recital? Bar mitzvah? Liver transplant? Oh my God. Did he just say "funeral"? That is the sickest, most appalling, most inhuman and unspeakably funny thing I've heard in a very long time. I knew right then and there that this book was a winner.
Anonymous Lawyer is also remarkable because it forces you to sympathize with its malevolent and misanthropic protagonist. You may hate his guts, but his observations about about himself and his colleagues are so insightful that you have to believe he really isn't such a terrible person. Sort of like Woody Allen. He's so honest about his neuroses that I will still watch his films even after he divorces Soon Yi and marries her daughter.
I also want to assure you that you will find this book hilarous even if you don't know the first thing about the law. It is just a story about human beings who happen to practice the law but obviously don't care about it all.
But if you are a lawyer, you will adore this book even more. Last week, my girlfriend and the other junior associates at her big corporate law firm discovered the book's promotional website, Anonymous Law Firm. Although they presumably have more important things to do, they sound found themselves all gathered around one monitor, cackling gleefully and periodically chanting, "It's so true! It's so true!"
If you are a lawyer, buy this book. If you know a lawyer, buy him or her this book. If you're a partner at a law firm, buy all existing copies of this book and burn them before your subordinates have a chance to read it. Then call up the IT department and have it block access to Jeremy Blachman's web site and blog. It's your only hope. (3) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 6:27 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Darfur was never the simplistic morality tale purveyed by the news media and humanitarian organizations...The rebels, much weaker than the government, would logically have sued for peace long ago. Because of the Save Darfur movement, however, the rebels believe that the longer they provoke genocidal retaliation, the more the West will pressure Sudan to hand them control of the regionDisturbing as that conclusion is, Kuperman does provide enough evidence to force non-experts on Darfur (such as myself) onto the defensive.
But first, let me observe that Kuperman has sterling academic credentials and no apparent partisan axes to grind. He received a doctorate in political science from MIT not long ago and then taught at Johns Hopkins/SAIS before joining the faculty at Texas.
In early 2000, Kuperman published a long essay in Foreign Affairs deconstructing the argument that it would have simple to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A few years ago, while doing some research on the Rwandan genocide, I read Kuperman's article and found it to be both well-research and persuasive.
Which isn't to say that I am anywhere close to agreeing with him on Darfur. I think that Nick Kristof sums up my thoughts quite well on his blog:
First, of course it’s more complicated than it seems at first. There are layers and layers of complexity to Darfur...But all that said, the essential truth is that Sudan’s government is slaughtering hundreds of thousands of people on the basis of their tribe and skin color – and that is genocide, and the rest is detail.I would also point out that Kuperman proposed altnerative for stopping the genocide in Darfur strikes me as naive in the extreme:
This is no job for United Nations peacekeepers...Rather, we should let Sudan's army handle any recalcitrant rebels, on condition that it eschew war crimes. This option will be distasteful to many, but Sudan has signed a peace treaty, so it deserves the right to defend its sovereignty against rebels who refuse to, so long as it observes the treaty and the laws of war.How can one possibly expect the government of Sudan to observe the laws of war if it has already sponsored one genocide? That's a little bit like saying that since Slobodan Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords, we should've trusted him to implement the accords as well, instead of sending NATO peacekeepers. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
Sunday, June 04, 2006
# Posted 10:40 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Although I am only beginning to investigate the literature on Vietnam, my instincts say that Krepinevich's book is superb. The writing is clear and concise and the research is extraordinary. As the footnotes indicate, Krepinevich built this book from the ground up with primary sources, since there were very few serious military histories of the war in Vietnam available in the early 1980s.
Krepinevich's book is an extended response to the late Col. Harry Summers' revisionist classic On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (pub. 1982). Summers' book represents the definitive statement of the hypothesis that the Army was winning the war in Vietnam but that the politicians lost it because of their excessive sensitivity to public criticism. Not surprisingly, Summers' book became a staple text at military academies and staff colleges shortly after it was written.
That is what I know from reading about On Strategy, not from reading the book itself. As such, it is now #1 on my reading list, since the only way I can have an informed opinion about Krepinevich's work is to read Summers'. Nonetheless, I found The Army and Vietnam to be so persuasive because of what I know broadly about the history and practice of counterinsurgency. I'll give Summers book a fighting chance when I read it, but it's going to be an uphill battle.
Krepinevich's main argument is that the Army lost the war in Vietnam by tenaciously applying conventional weapons and conventional strategies to unconventional warfare. In short, the Army wanted to refight World War II even though it was facing the Vietcong instead of the Wehrmacht or the Soviets.
Why was the Army so intransigent? The answer is that old saying about the hammer and the nail. When you have a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. The US military's first and foremost mission during the 1950s and 1960s was to prepare for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Building on its success in World War II, the US military prepared to repel a Soviet invasion by building up a heavily-armed and heavily-armored fighting force.
Unable to match the Soviets in terms of manpower, the US military sought to overwhelm its potential opponent with technology and firepower. As soldiers were fond of saying, "It is better to send a bullet than a man." Yet when fighting insurgents, it is very dangerous to send a bullet to do a man's job. The indiscriminate use of firepower by the US military had a horrific impact on Vietnamese civilians.
Much less known, Krepinevich writes, is that the indiscriminate use of firepower wasted countless American lives as well. (p.201) By littering the countryside with unexploded ordnance, the US provided the VC with the raw materials for traps and mines that killed 1,000 US servicemen in 1966 alone.
Countless lives were also spent during the massive search-and-destroy missions that American generals preferred. Instead of providing security to the Vietnamese population in accord with well-established counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army preferred to chase the Vietcong around rural Vietnam, hoping to force the insurgents into decisive battles.
But the insurgents rarely gave battle, because they understood that guerrillas wars are not won on the battlefield. The one time that the guerrillas did resort to a conventional strategy, during the Tet Offensive, they paid for it dearly. But even then, the decision to engage was entirely the guerrillas. Even with half a million men, unmatched firepower, and technology the likes of which the world had never seen, the US military could not force the Vietcong into battle.
As I know from occasional comments appended to my post, there is a vocal contingent of OxBlog readers who subscribe to the idea that the politicians lost a war in Vietnam that the Army was winning. If you belong to that contingent, I hope you will read Krepinevich's book. My promise to you is that I will read Summers', as well its companion by Lewis Sorley.
Let the debate begin. (21) opinions -- Add your opinion
Friday, June 02, 2006
# Posted 6:30 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Willful, targeted brutality designed to send a message to Iraqis.Kristol jests that the Marines must be very poor at sending messages to the people of Iraq if they tried to cover-up what happened at Haditha.
Next, he provides an extended quote from Peter Beinart's column [no link] about Haditha:
Americans can be as barbaric as anyone. What makes us an exceptional nation with the capacity to lead and inspire the world is our very recognition of that fact. We are capable of Hadithas and My Lais, so is everyone. But few societies are capable of acknowledging what happened, bringing the killers to justice, and instituting changes that make it less likely to happen again. That's how we show we are different from the jihadists. We don't just assert it. We prove it. That's the liberal version of American exceptionalism, and it's what we need right now in response to this horror.When I first read that quote, I didn't see anything wrong with it. Part of what makes America exceptional is that it can acknowledge its war crimes and punish their perpetrators. Yet as Kristol points out, Beinart's language is too categorical:
Let's be clear: Crimes and cover-ups cannot be excused or tolerated. They must be investigated, and the individuals involved, and their commanders, must be held accountable and punished...But it is not true that "what makes us an exceptional nation with the capacity to lead and inspire the world" is that we recognize we can be barbaric and that we punish barbarism.Although the reference to "ten Hadithas" strikes me as a poor choice of words, I believe Kristol's overall point is correct. The essence of America and the essence of jihadist terrorism are so profoundly antagonistic that we have nothing to prove.
Now, one possible response to Kristol is that he is reading far to much into a single passage from Beinart. A single column should not be confused with a detailed philosophy. Yet Beinart's comments dovetail fully with the contents of a lecture I saw him give about his new book, The Good Fight.
In that lecture, Beinart unequivocally defined the difference between liberalism and conservatism as follows: Liberals believe that America's greatness rests on its ability to question its own conduct and ethos. Conservatives believe that the greatest threat to American pre-eminence is excessive questioning of its own conduct and ethos.
I won't comment further, since I haven't read Beinart's book yet even though it is sitting on my dinner table. But I think we may have reached an interesting point of convergence where both lib hawks and neo-con agree on what the essence of liberalism. If so, that is a point from which a vigorous debate can begin. (18) opinions -- Add your opinion
Thursday, June 01, 2006
# Posted 11:07 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Sensenbrenner's colleagues typically use a single word to describe him. "He's tough," Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia told reporters at a breakfast last week. "He really takes an unusual delight in these conferences," Rep. Peter King of New York said of Sensenbrenner. "He relishes that type of combat." Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, whose district borders Sensenbrenner's, told me, "He's a tough guy to reckon with, a tough negotiator, and he's taking a tougher stance as this thing progresses."But presidents have a way of imposing their will on Congress, especially on members of their own party. So who knows? (1) opinions -- Add your opinion