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Friday, December 28, 2007
# Posted 4:16 PM by Taylor Owen 
If Kenneth Anderson’s writings are the vintage Pinot Noir of the neocon vinyard, Podhoretz’s manifesto is the rancid two-dollar Spumante.ha! (9) opinions -- Add your opinion
Thursday, December 27, 2007
# Posted 1:53 PM by Patrick Porter
Over Christmas, I had a read through 'World War IV', culture warrior Norman Podhoretz's latest call to arms. And just in time for Christmas, its an awful turkey of a thing.
But before dissecting it, its worth making some observations about the broad political philosophy ‘neo-conservatism.’ Thanks to the horrific loss of life and anarchy in Iraq especially in late 2006, the word ‘neocon’, like the word ‘liberal’ in US domestic politics, has degenerated into an empty and lazy word for anything in foreign policy that is undesirable.
So in some quarters both right and left, to believe in containing Iranian nuclear ambitions through sanctions and a global alliance, or to enjoy the film ‘300′, or even to favour continued in-principle support for Israel’s existence, is to be hyper-aggressive, irresponsible and naive.
In fact, neoconservatism is a school of thought with defenders who vary wildly in their intellectual calibre. One of its more powerful spokesmen is Kenneth Anderson, whose overall appraisal of the failures and insights of neocons is one I share:
In the case of Iraq, neoconservatives preferred war. Their search for a quick and painless democratic transformation, which they did not find, was a naive one. But their other belief was not so naive: this is the belief that over the long run, the realist strategy of accommodation and containment of execrable regimes – the pursuit of stability at all moral costs practised by the West for thirty years – would only serve to feed the beast.
In other words, neoconservatism is a form of tough democratic idealism, and it has its strengths and weaknesses. Its strength is to go beyond amoral and short-sighted policies of backing friendly dictatorships no matter how reprehensible, to see the linkages between long-term security and political liberalisation, and to seek some alignment between liberal values and foreign policy beyond the paralysing ineffectuality of liberal internationalism.
It has also contributed to serious foreign policy failure. Needless to say, so has so-called realism. President Jimmy Carter and Brent Scowcroft, quick to point to Iraq as a vindication of their world view, may be reminded that it was ‘realist’ counsel that led Carter to encourage Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980, a catastrophic attack that became the longest conventional war of the past century, beggared two countries, killed millions, involved chemical warfare and ‘human wave’ slaughters. Its unfortunate that so much foreign policy debate and analysis of the crises in the Arab-Islamic world is carried on as though ‘neocons’ are the only ones with any explaining to do.
But if neoconservatism has an ideational value, its failures also need to be recognised and explained. One of those failures is the underlying and misplaced confidence that if the ideology and policy is correct, execution and detail don't matter that much. This can be done with the aid of Podhoretz’s book. If Kenneth Anderson’s writings are the vintage Pinot Noir of the neocon vinyard, Podhoretz’s manifesto is the rancid two-dollar Spumante.
‘World War IV’ is written primarily to endorse the ’Bush Doctrine’ (the need to spread democratic freedom to ensure US security) and from a hugely partisan standpoint to defend Bush against any and all charges. Most importantly, his argument is strong on belligerent rhetoric and the need for resolution and a historic sense of mission. We must awaken and realise the threat, Podhoretz argues, and mobilise together against the foe.
But it is strategically illiterate. The will to prevail in a vital struggle is not a strategy. Churchill’s soaring speeches used to end with a call to solidarity and common purpose, but this call would be preceded with an outline and strategic vision of the conflict. By contrast, the relationship between ends, ways and means, the search for achievable goals, the direction of resources towards a goal, the development of more astute strategy from inevitable and avoidable mistakes, none of this is considered in any depth by Podhoretz. Instead, we get a morality tale containing only a plea for greater willpower and a resentment of people who disagree. Capacity or competence is barely considered.
Disturbingly, Presidential candidate Rudi Guliani has appointed Podhoretz as an advisor and has identified himself with this book. Rudi’s continual claim about foreign policy is that he will ’stay on offence’ against Islamic terrorists. What does this mean? I would assume that any responsible US President would continue to pursue, arrest, capture and kill AQ agents, and there is little there that even the far left wing of the Democratic Party would dispute. Beyond that, is he saying he would like to stay in Iraq for thirty years, expand the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan, bomb Iran, or dismantle civil liberties or legal obstructions at home? The point is, we don’t really know, and maybe neither does he. Podhoretz takes rather longer to say roughly the same thing, and without much idea of any policy content. It would just read as a silly manifesto, were it not being taken seriously in some influential quarters.
An aggressive rhetorical posture is not a strategy. It is a sound-bite. And his book has a few other dragons.
Podhoretz is a conservative cultural critic ever mindful of the 1960’s, and he also launches attacks on a host of enemies in the US, from extremist campus professors to hippies revisiting the glory days of Vietnam war protests, from the Clinton Administration who apparently with AQ deserve all of the blame for 9/11, to conservative isolationists. But its not sufficient to criticise their positions. If Podhoretz wishes to mobilise all of America for a global struggle against militant jihadism, he needs to make a substantive case for how this might be done. Instead, much of the book is a lament that the 1950’s are over and won’t be coming back.
Beneath the surface of much of this debate, between those who argue that America has isolated itself and those who argue that the world has abandoned America, there is a more interesting story. France and Germany have politically evolved into pretty close Atlantic partners. The Bush administration has managed over a few years to craft a diverse coalition of partners with an interest in containing or at least counterbalancing Tehran with its regimes existential hatred of Israel. America rates very highly in polls of Indian opinion, and even the countries most vocally critical of American unilateralism continue to track down, round up and pursue wanted terrorists. Sunni insurgents of 2003-5 have turned on their predatory guests AQI, who are now reeling from the Anbar awakening. The long project of containing AQ is unspectacularly working, without a need to silence dissent or unify America behind Podhoretz’s world war.
But this complexity is often lost in the polarising rhetoric of the ‘neocon’ debate, a debate that has suffered a bit at the hands of Podhoretz’s strange screed.
Labels: War on Terror
(9) opinions -- Add your opinionWednesday, December 26, 2007
# Posted 12:22 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Before laying out the rationale for this decision, I would just like to point out that there are two kinds of anonymity in the comment section. One is the ability to post as "anonymous", indistinguishable from any other anonymous reader. Yet even if you have a login, no one else has access to any information about your true identity, place of residence, or other personal information (unless you choose to share it). That is a kind of anonymity we value and are not asking any of our readers to compromise.
Up to this point, an overwhelming majority of posts left by "anonymous" have contributed to a vigorous debate in the comments section, mostly civil and mostly substantive. However, a very small number of individuals have abused their anonymity by launching repeated ad hominem attacks against one of the authors on this site or even trying to intimidate one of the authors in a personal manner. We think you will agree that this is completely unacceptable.
In addition, we regret that many of those who post anonymously in a responsible manner will have to go to the trouble of establishing a login in order to comment further. However, given that logins are cost free and require minimal effort to establish, we believe that this is a reasonable request to make in exchange for the right to post.
Finally, we would like to express our belief that requiring a login will in no way restrict the substance of debate on this site. For quite some time now, named commenters have argued for positions that range all the way across the political spectrum. (Well, maybe a little further to the right.) In addition, named commenters have vigorously, but fairly, attacked the positions advocated by this blog's authors, again from both the left and the right. If you don't already have one, we hope you'll get yourself a nom de plume or nom de guerre and continue commenting on this site. (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, December 25, 2007
# Posted 8:09 AM by Taylor Owen
A SAVAGE CHRISTMAS IN IRAQ: Once again, Al Qaeda in Iraq has demonstrated the brutality for which it is so widely known and despised. In spite of suffering heavy losses this year precisely because the people of Iraq turned against its vicious ways, Al Qaeda has learned nothing, while we have adapted.
Today's suicide bombings were horrific, but the number of such attacks has been falling consistently over the past several months. The war is not over, not by a longshot. But if our commander and our troops keep on doing what they have been, 2008 will give us and the people of Iraq much to be proud of.
David Adesnik (5) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 8:07 AM by Taylor Owen
POSTED FOR DAVID BY TAYLOR
BEWARE OF GLOBAL WARMING COOLING! Thirty years ago, prominent men of both science and journalism expressed great concern about the potential for a dangerous freefall of global temperatures. As one of them wrote:Since the 1940's the northern half of our planet has been cooling rapidly. Already the effect in the United States is the same as if every city had been picked up by giant hands and set down more than 100 miles closer to the North Pole. If the cooling continues, warned the National Academy of Sciences in 1975, we could possibly witness the beginning of the next great Ice Age. Conceivably, some of us might live to see huge snowfields remaining year-round in northern regions of the United States and Europe. Probably, we would see mass global famine in our lifetimes, perhaps even within a decade. Since 1970, half a million human beings in North Africa and Asia have starved because of floods and droughts caused by the cooling climate.
I came across this quote, attributed to Lowell Ponte, while reading Global Warming: A Very Short Introduction, written by Mark Maslin and published by Oxford University Press. The author's self-avowed objective is to persuade his readers to adopt a more "collectivized" and "egalitarian" approach to the threat of global warming, or to affirm such an approach if they already favor it. ( pp.40-42) Maslin teaches geography at University College of London. Although Americans associate "geography" with the memorization of state capitals, in British English it refers to a discipline that we might call environmental studies, broadly defined.
Given Maslin's agenda, I think it's fair to say that his inclusion of Ponte's quote shouldn't be taken as a crude effort to discredit today's warnings of environmental disaster. Rather, Maslin approaches the global cooling myths of the 70s as an example of how scientists can make seriously mistakes, but ultimately correct themselves by virtue of their dedication to finding and analyzing new evidence.
In spite of this admirable self-awareness, Maslin doesn't really take a balanced approach to the politics of global warming, at least so far. (I'm halfway through the book right now.) For example, Maslin describes those who discount the threat of global warming as "individualists…Their success is often measured by their wealth and the number of followers they can command. Victorian mill owners or self-made oil barons are good representatives of this category." (pp.38-39) Maslin may as well add that skeptics of global warming like to kick puppies and hunt endangered species for sport.
In spite of such excesses, Maslin does cover a fair amount of basic science that places the global warming debate in a much more useful context than, say, the polemics of Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth. For example Maslin describes how, from a truly long-term perspective, the earth is in a period of relatively low temperatures. 100 million years ago, in the age of dinosaurs, the earth was far warmer than it is today. Over the past million years, there have been Ice Ages at regular intervals. Over the past 10,000 years, the earth's temperature has risen consistently as it emerged from the most recent Ice Age.
What does all of this mean for the debate about global warming? I'm not sure. I started reading Maslin's book precisely because I don't know much about climate change (or to be more precise, I've forgotten what I learned when I sophomore in college back in the spring of '97.) Unlike almost any other scientific issue, global warming is water cooler talk just about everywhere. If it 80 degrees one day in October, people casually talk about global warming. I'd like to know a little more.
UPDATE: I did a bit of quick googling for Lowell Ponte and came up with some interesting results. These days, Ponte is an internet-based conservative pundit, among other things. There also seem to be a fair number of conservative sites and comments that hold up his best-selling book from 1976 as evidence that it is best to ignore scientists' reckless predictions of imminent disaster, hot or cold.
David Adesnik
Saturday, December 22, 2007
# Posted 11:45 AM by Taylor Owen
ON THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELINES: It is often difficult to disentangle the debates on Afghanistan and Iraq. The two are not the same, as Tony Cordsman demonstrates convincingly in his latest brief. Part of the problem of course is the rhetoric used for both tends to slip into the same fight against islamo-fascism story. In this regard, Harper's shift in language in Canada has been particularly unhelpful in distinguishing the conflict Canadians supported (Afghanistan) from the one they widely did not (Iraq).
One issue that gets improperly conflated between the two is the issue of timelines. If timelines are good in Iraq, as the Democrats are telling us in the US, then surely they should then be good in Afghanistan as well, as the Liberals in Canada claim? In fact, I would argue that timelines are good for US engagement in Iraq, and not for NATO engagement in Afghanistan. Let me explain.
In Iraq, a significant majority of the population (lets say 80%), view Americans as occupiers and actually support attacks against them. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, a significant majority of the population (some polls say 90%), support NATO presence. In Iraq, therefore, the timelines would serve to demonstrate to a unsupportive population that the US is not permanently occupying their country. A positive thing, and likely to bring local support to their side. In Afghanistan, the lack of a timeline would show Afghan's that the international community is committed to staying long enough to fight off the resurging Taliban, who by all accounts are making progress in the south and convincing local populations that it is better, in the long term, to side with them. A timeline in Afghanistan would support the rhetoric of the Taliban and likely drive support to them.
Timelines are good in Iraq because they will serve to convince the unsupportive population that the occupation is not permanent. Timelines are bad in Afghanistan because they would suggest to a supportive population that it would be in their long term interests to side with the resurging Taliban.
One issue that gets improperly conflated between the two is the issue of timelines. If timelines are good in Iraq, as the Democrats are telling us in the US, then surely they should then be good in Afghanistan as well, as the Liberals in Canada claim? In fact, I would argue that timelines are good for US engagement in Iraq, and not for NATO engagement in Afghanistan. Let me explain.
In Iraq, a significant majority of the population (lets say 80%), view Americans as occupiers and actually support attacks against them. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, a significant majority of the population (some polls say 90%), support NATO presence. In Iraq, therefore, the timelines would serve to demonstrate to a unsupportive population that the US is not permanently occupying their country. A positive thing, and likely to bring local support to their side. In Afghanistan, the lack of a timeline would show Afghan's that the international community is committed to staying long enough to fight off the resurging Taliban, who by all accounts are making progress in the south and convincing local populations that it is better, in the long term, to side with them. A timeline in Afghanistan would support the rhetoric of the Taliban and likely drive support to them.
Timelines are good in Iraq because they will serve to convince the unsupportive population that the occupation is not permanent. Timelines are bad in Afghanistan because they would suggest to a supportive population that it would be in their long term interests to side with the resurging Taliban.
Labels: Afghanistan, Iraq, Timelines
(8) opinions -- Add your opinionWednesday, December 19, 2007
# Posted 8:04 PM by Taylor Owen
Rudy is: Bush + fiscal conservatism + more brains + better communications skills + more experience + an ability to bang heads as necessary. I think Amerians would vote for that in large numbers.There is something a little precious about a Bush supporter telling Americans not to worry because this new and improved Bush (Rudy), is far better than the last Bush, whom they supported as well, twice. How about someone who is not at all like Bush? I think Americans are going to vote for someone like that in large numbers. (11) opinions -- Add your opinion
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
# Posted 7:58 PM by Taylor Owen
For my money, Obama wins in any scenario, and Hillary beats everyone (just) but McCain head on. If McCain is the independent and Huckabee is the GOP, all bets are off.
UPDATE: And then there is the wild card. (4) opinions -- Add your opinion
Sunday, December 16, 2007
# Posted 10:57 AM by Taylor Owen
HUCKABEE A DISASTER? Rich Lowry of the National Review says that Huckabee is the GOPs Howard Dean -- an untested governor who is surging in the polls because he appeals to one niche within the party. Lowry adds that like Dean, Huckabee's nomination would be tantamount to suicide for his party.
I haven't had the chance to read much about Huckabee yet, but have found his performances in debates and interviews were quite proficient, even if I disagree with some of his stands. But I strongly agree with this point made by Lowry:
Then, there's national security, the Republican trump card during the Cold War and after 9/11. Huckabee not only has zero national-security credentials, he basically has no foreign-policy advisers either, as a New York Times Magazine piece this Sunday makes clear.
Posted by David (10) opinions -- Add your opinion
Thursday, December 13, 2007
# Posted 3:58 PM by Taylor Owen
DES MOINES, Dec. 12 -- When senior advisers to Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton awakened to the fact that they faced a serious problem in Iowa, they knew they needed a summit. For the divided staff, the question was where.A journalists finds out that political operatives are afraid of stories about panic. So what does she do? She writes a story about it. It's amazing how journalists pretend to be observers, rather than participants, in the political process.
It made sense to fly to Iowa, where support for Clinton (N.Y.) was flagging and her aides were scrambling to make up ground. But a key member of her inner circle, Harold Ickes, warned that a crowd of Arlington-based operatives descending on the Plains en masse might set off alarm bells, triggering "campaign in panic mode" stories, according to two people with inside knowledge of the Clinton operation.
On Iowa, I also recommend taking a look at Joe Gandelman's comments on the cocaine issue. Hillary -- the one woman who can bring together Republicans and Obama supporters. As the saying goes, she's a uniter, not a divider.
Posted by David (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 11:22 AM by Taylor Owen
Cheers,
David (0) opinions -- Add your opinion
Friday, December 07, 2007
# Posted 9:20 AM by Taylor Owen
FROM KANDAHAR TO CARNEGIE: David and I have the piece below in this morning's Toronto Star. It tries to link the supply side of the opium problem (our failing counter narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan), to our failure to address the domestic demand side of the issue. Closing Vancouver's Insite supervised injection site would be a major step backwards, both in our strategic capability to address the challenges posed by poppy production in Afghanistan, and in our moral responsibility to help our own citizens in need. The opium problem begins at home, and harm reduction is a key component of this fight.
Failed strategy connects Afghan fields, city streets
In the coming months, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, U.S. private contractors will likely attempt to fumigate poppies in Afghanistan. Around the same time, the Canadian government will decide whether to shut down the Insite supervised injection site in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.
Failed strategy connects Afghan fields, city streets
In the coming months, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, U.S. private contractors will likely attempt to fumigate poppies in Afghanistan. Around the same time, the Canadian government will decide whether to shut down the Insite supervised injection site in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.
The two policies are inextricably linked and unambiguously bad.
In April, the United States appointed William Wood, nicknamed "Chemical Bill," its new ambassador to Afghanistan. In his previous post, Wood championed and oversaw the fumigation of large swaths of the Colombian countryside. The result? For every 67 acres sprayed, only one acre of coca was eradicated. Moreover, production increased by 36 per cent. In addition, the spraying negatively impacted legitimate crops, contaminated water supplies and increased respiratory infections among the exposed populations.
Wood is in Kabul for a single reason – to execute a similar plan in Afghanistan. Poppy production, once held in check by the Taliban government, is exploding – up 60 per cent in
2006. Poppies yield 10 times the value of wheat, so it is unsurprising that about 10 per cent of an otherwise impoverished Afghan population partakes in the illicit poppy harvest. It earns them upwards of $3 billion (U.S.) a year, or roughly 65 per cent of Afghan GDP.
The short-term economic costs and long-term development and health impacts of fumigation will be borne by those whose livelihoods are both directly and indirectly connected to poppy cultivation. Spraying could easily cause public opinion to turn against the Karzai administration and NATO forces, further compromising the mission and increasing the danger to Canadian soldiers.
Given the increased risks this policy poses to both our soldiers and the overall mission, the
government's silence is unconscionable. Others have not been so quiet. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently observed that there is little international support for fumigation. He announced an alternative policy to wean farmers off of opium, one that includes an ambitious plan to top up payments for legal crops, such as wheat.
Such policies, however, are only part of a long-term project. Success will require a holistic view, one that understands the connections between the consumption of illicit drugs in places like Vancouver and their cultivation in Afghanistan. Specifically, this means tackling the demand for opiates. Although 90 per cent of world heroin comes from Afghanistan, the vast majority is consumed in western countries. Blaming Afghan farmers for the problem is as hypocritical as it is ineffective.
Reducing the cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan begins not on the streets of Kandahar, but on the streets of Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.
Fortunately, such policies exist. Insite, Vancouver's supervised injection site, offers a real first step toward reducing poppy cultivation. This small storefront provides drug users with a sanitary and safe place to inject in the presence of registered nurses. The result: 21 peer-reviewed studies document how Insite diminishes public drug use, reduces the spread of HIV and increases the number of users who enter detox programs.
But Insite does more than get drug use off the street. It is a portal into the health-care system for addicts who are too often shut out. Drug users who visit Insite are an astounding 33 per cent more likely to enlist in a detoxification program. Indeed, Insite has added a second
facility, called Onsite, that capitalizes on this success by allowing drug users to immediately access detox and drug treatment services on demand.
Sadly, the Harper government remains ideologically opposed to Insite. It is unclear if the federal government possesses the legal authority to close the site but there is significant concern it will attempt to do so within six months.
The Conservatives should be looking to scale Insite nationally, not contemplating its closing. A national network of injection sites could dramatically reduce heroin use in Canada by channelling more drug users into drug treatment programs. Diminishing the demand for heroin would in turn devalue the poppies from which it is derived. Changing this economic
equation is both safer and more effective than fumigation if the goal is shifting Afghan production from poppies to legal crops. Admittedly, Canada's share of the global consumption of heroin is relatively small, but our success could provide a powerful and effective example to the international community.
To many Canadians, Afghanistan is a world away. But the lives of drug users outside Vancouver's Carnegie Centre and those of our soldiers in Kandahar are bound together –
linked by the international opium trade. What we do in Afghanistan shapes events in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, and vice versa. Canada's soldiers, drug users and ordinary citizens deserve a government that recognizes this reality.
Labels: Afghanistan, Opium
(17) opinions -- Add your opinionWednesday, December 05, 2007
# Posted 9:39 AM by Taylor Owen
QUICK THOUGHTS ON 'THE UNEXPECTED WAR': Janice Stein and Eugene Lang have written a great book on the first 5 years of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan. I won't review it in full, but a few of quick points.
First, this is a very effective model for a foreign policy book. Lang was on the inside, so we are privy to the story as it evolved in Cabinet. Stein is a great writer, and brings an analytic clarity to the work that complements the policy wonk writing of Lang. She also has the academic and intellectual credibility that clearly led to impressive access to candid interviews with the real players in this story.
Second, this book both praises and damns Hillier. The story of how he romanced Graham and Martin is important, and clearly demonstrates his intelligence and revolutionary spirit within the military bureaucracy. He is the Canadian Rumsfeld. However, there is little doubt that he oversold the military's capability to do both Afghanistan and Darfur - a clear precondition for Martin's support of going to Kandahar. What's more, he also was not honest on his intentions to stay longer than a year, advocating for an expanded role before we even deployed. One is left wondering whether the PMO's case for Andrew Leslie as CDS instead of Hillier was prescient.
Third, the military hysteria around US relations is a knee jerk reaction that undermines Canadian foreign policy. It has got to change. Time and time again, Stein and Lang detail the exaggerated warnings by the military of the consequences of not aligning with US policy. Iraq and BMD were supposedly death nails in US-Canada relations. Neither proved to be even remotely the case. There is a reason that the DM positions controlling our military are split. Civilian military leadership may not be good at procurement, but they do know politics. Related, this point seems particularly important now that we have a government that is more sympathetic to the types of arguments the military were making regarding streamlining with the US military.
Fourth, the story Stein and Lang tell of the federal bureaucracy, and their clear inability/unwillingness to implement any real form of integration is proof that if we are serious about 3D, or any such integrated peacebuilding model, then a laissez-faire approach is wholly insufficient. The British model of incentivised funding structures, in their case Conflict Pools, is going to have to be considered much more seriously than it has to date.
Fifth, the military component of our mission is engaging in tactics that Stein and Lang believe fundamentally undermine the mission. What's more, the balance between the three D's of the mission are so disproportionately weighted to the military that the impact and effectiveness other the two are significantly marginalized. I agree with both points, as Patrick Travers and I argued here. Stein and Lang, however, fail to draw out the consequences of such a critique. What are the implications of this argument? Seems to me that the logical conclusion to their damning assessment is to either address the unbalance and the tactics that threaten the mission, or get out and stop pretending that we are doing something we are not.
Or, maybe these critiques don't actually matter. Perhaps integrated peacebuilding is just a rhetorical tool to sell counterinsurgency to a country which wants to peacekeep. In which case, as you were.
(1) opinions
--
Add your opinion
First, this is a very effective model for a foreign policy book. Lang was on the inside, so we are privy to the story as it evolved in Cabinet. Stein is a great writer, and brings an analytic clarity to the work that complements the policy wonk writing of Lang. She also has the academic and intellectual credibility that clearly led to impressive access to candid interviews with the real players in this story.
Second, this book both praises and damns Hillier. The story of how he romanced Graham and Martin is important, and clearly demonstrates his intelligence and revolutionary spirit within the military bureaucracy. He is the Canadian Rumsfeld. However, there is little doubt that he oversold the military's capability to do both Afghanistan and Darfur - a clear precondition for Martin's support of going to Kandahar. What's more, he also was not honest on his intentions to stay longer than a year, advocating for an expanded role before we even deployed. One is left wondering whether the PMO's case for Andrew Leslie as CDS instead of Hillier was prescient.
Third, the military hysteria around US relations is a knee jerk reaction that undermines Canadian foreign policy. It has got to change. Time and time again, Stein and Lang detail the exaggerated warnings by the military of the consequences of not aligning with US policy. Iraq and BMD were supposedly death nails in US-Canada relations. Neither proved to be even remotely the case. There is a reason that the DM positions controlling our military are split. Civilian military leadership may not be good at procurement, but they do know politics. Related, this point seems particularly important now that we have a government that is more sympathetic to the types of arguments the military were making regarding streamlining with the US military.
Fourth, the story Stein and Lang tell of the federal bureaucracy, and their clear inability/unwillingness to implement any real form of integration is proof that if we are serious about 3D, or any such integrated peacebuilding model, then a laissez-faire approach is wholly insufficient. The British model of incentivised funding structures, in their case Conflict Pools, is going to have to be considered much more seriously than it has to date.
Fifth, the military component of our mission is engaging in tactics that Stein and Lang believe fundamentally undermine the mission. What's more, the balance between the three D's of the mission are so disproportionately weighted to the military that the impact and effectiveness other the two are significantly marginalized. I agree with both points, as Patrick Travers and I argued here. Stein and Lang, however, fail to draw out the consequences of such a critique. What are the implications of this argument? Seems to me that the logical conclusion to their damning assessment is to either address the unbalance and the tactics that threaten the mission, or get out and stop pretending that we are doing something we are not.
Or, maybe these critiques don't actually matter. Perhaps integrated peacebuilding is just a rhetorical tool to sell counterinsurgency to a country which wants to peacekeep. In which case, as you were.
Tuesday, December 04, 2007
# Posted 10:43 AM by Taylor Owen
WHERE DID THE ALLIANCE GO?: With Howard's loss last week in Australia, Prime Minister Harper has found himself as a somewhat reluctant, and one might say lonely stalwart of the Bush driven Atlantic alliance. Particularly on climate change, but also to some degree on Iraq, (he is in denial of the former and was in favor of the latter), he now stands in notable contrast to both British and Australian governments. With all likelihood, the US will also soon diverge on both.
Lucky for him, the lack of international temptation will probably serve him well at home, as the Canadian public is largely more sympathetic to the new emerging Atlantic consensus. The main question is whether Harper will stick to his principles or buck to popular pressure. For what it's worth, my bet is that his conservatisms runs deep and will not be easily shed despite electoral temptations. Bad news for the Conservative Party, good news for the Liberals.
(5) opinions
--
Add your opinion
Lucky for him, the lack of international temptation will probably serve him well at home, as the Canadian public is largely more sympathetic to the new emerging Atlantic consensus. The main question is whether Harper will stick to his principles or buck to popular pressure. For what it's worth, my bet is that his conservatisms runs deep and will not be easily shed despite electoral temptations. Bad news for the Conservative Party, good news for the Liberals.
Friday, November 30, 2007
# Posted 7:26 AM by Taylor Owen
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
# Posted 6:21 AM by Taylor Owen
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
# Posted 5:48 AM by Taylor Owen
And if Dobbsianism is winning when times are good, you can imagine how attractive it’s going to seem if we enter the serious recession that Larry Summers convincingly and terrifyingly forecasts in yesterday’s Financial Times. If the economy dips as seriously as that, the political climate could shift in ugly ways.
So it’s worth pointing out now more than ever that Dobbsianism is fundamentally wrong. It plays on legitimate anxieties, but it rests at heart on a more existential fear — the fear that America is under assault and is fundamentally fragile. It rests on fears that the America we once knew is bleeding away.
And that’s just not true. In the first place, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle, the United States still possesses the most potent economy on earth. Recently the World Economic Forum and the International Institute for Management Development produced global competitiveness indexes, and once again they both ranked the United States first in the world.
...
Second, America’s fundamental economic strength is rooted in the most stable of assets — its values. The U.S. is still an astonishing assimilation machine. It has successfully absorbed more than 20 million legal immigrants over the past quarter-century, an extraordinary influx of human capital. Americans are remarkably fertile. Birthrates are relatively high, meaning that in 2050, the average American will be under 40, while the average European, Chinese and Japanese will be more than a decade older.
...
Third, not every economic dislocation has been caused by trade and the Chinese. Between 1991 and 2007, the U.S. trade deficit exploded to $818 billion from $31 billion. Yet as Robert Samuelson has pointed out, during that time the U.S. created 28 million jobs and the unemployment rate dipped to 4.6 percent from 6.8 percent. That’s because, as Robert Lawrence of Harvard and Martin Baily of McKinsey have calculated, 90 percent of manufacturing job losses are due to domestic forces. As companies become more technologically advanced, they shed workers (the Chinese shed 25 million manufacturing jobs between 1994 and 2004).
Who said the NYT oped page is avoiding the blogosphere?...I say they are now, post wall take-down, starting to adopt some of its best elements...but that is another post...
Labels: David Brooks, Lou Dobbs
(6) opinions -- Add your opinionMonday, November 26, 2007
# Posted 7:03 AM by Taylor Owen
Such a blow is struck in Leslie Campbell’s review of Naomi Klein’s new book, The Shock Doctrine, published in the Literary Review of Canada.
In much the same way Potter and Heath nailed it re. No Logo, Campbell’s review is so powerful because it fundamentally challenges the central tenant of Klein’s work, that she is providing a progressive alternative to the conservative market forces driving, in her view, global inequality. Moreover, it does so from the heart of the left - The author is linked the to the federal NDP.
Campbell’s core critique is that Klein is not progressive at all, she is actually a conservative. As he puts it:
“A hankering for the old days (in Klein’s case, the era of John Maynard Keynes) and suspicion of change are the hallmarks of true conservatism. Reminiscent of the Canadian Tory wag who once quipped that the Magna Carta was “too much, too soon,” Klein’s admiration of Keynes and the “mixed, regulated economy that created the New Deal” can sound quaint and dated. New Deal economics transformed North America, but positive innovations since then, many based on encouraging entrepreneurial wealth creation and liberalizing trade arrangements, deserve more attention. Also, in critiquing selected international economic transitions—most notably Russia, Poland, South Africa and Iraq—Klein occasionally sounds nostalgic for a past that was, for many people, at least as negative as the present.”This can of course be said of much of the left writ large, where nostalgia has in many regards replaced progressivism, in any meaningful and historically accurate sense of the term. Certainly in Canada, there can be little doubt that the NDP are the most conservative party in the country (save perhaps the Bloc’s view of Quebecois Nationalism).
Understandably, conservatives are not too pleased with their new bedfellows, but on the central point, Jonathan Kay agrees with Campbell:
Leslie's got it right: As with many anti-corporate activists, Klein's vision for the world is essentially old-fashioned and sentimental. She imagines workers organizing into small-scale collectivist cottage shops of the type that globalization and technology rendered obsolete generations ago. The economic model Klein wants for developing nations is essentially the same one our own grandparents eagerly cast aside when modern capitalism made them rich after the Second World War.Kay goes on to provide some useful clarity on conservatism and capitalism re. the Klein review, but this is somewhat tangential to Campbell’s critique.
I will avoid the temptation to go further, only to say, there is an emerging progressivism that moves beyond the highly conservative restraints of the socialist left. Something these guys are early champions of. As Campbell concludes, it is tired and out of date:
The book winds down with a rather familiar defence of “democratic socialism” (good socialism as practiced by Hugo Chavez) as opposed to “authoritarian Communism” (bad socialism as practiced by Stalin) or social democracy (cheap sell-out of socialism practiced by Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and their ilk). To those in left-wing circles this is a hoary and tired debate, but Klein resuscitates it as brand new, quoting 1970 memos from Kissinger to Nixon like newfound gems. To have the young and talented Klein, hero to a generation of wired, plugged-in idealists looking for a place in the world, concluding that the political future is “markets existing alongside the nationalization of the banks and mines” is almost as discouraging as having to fight the powerful, unaccountable multinationals she skewered so skillfully in No Logo.Lest anyone think I, or I think I can safely say Campbell for that matter, are arguing in favor of conservatism. Quite the opposite, as it is the very drift of much of the left that concerns me. More on this later though...
Labels: Naomi Klein, progressivism
(1) opinions -- Add your opinionSaturday, November 24, 2007
# Posted 12:11 PM by Taylor Owen
Friday, November 23, 2007
# Posted 8:54 AM by Taylor Owen
Now the bad. The current government is trying to shut down the supervised injection site in Vancouver. The site has been an unqualified success, and serves as a portal to getting people into the health care system. If anyone thinks these people should just be locked up, watch this short but tragic globe and mail documentary. That's right, just lockin'em up will do it. Nonsense. This gets directly into a discussion of the seriously flawed irradiation policy that will likely be undertaken this winter in Afghanistan. I'll have more on this asap, but just to muddy the waters a bit, Canada exports almost as much illegal narcotics as Afghanistan. Perhaps we should start at home, or, shockingly, with the demand side of this problem.
Lest one think these are unrelated, the war in Afghanistan has brought to light wider international issues that directly effect our potential success. Both Pakistan and the opium trade are serious destabilizing forces in Afghanistan. Dealing with both is therefore critical to our continued involvement. As Dave and I argued, here, there are deal breakers in this war. The status quo on both Pakistan and the global opium trade, are unsustainable. (2) opinions -- Add your opinion
Saturday, November 17, 2007
# Posted 9:14 AM by Taylor Owen
ht - KO. (14) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 9:13 AM by Taylor Owen
ADDENDUM: Since this post generated such interest, let me add a further example to prove the rule...just took the overnight from Calgary to London. It's an 8 hour flight. Took off at 9pm. Lots of drinking with dinner, understandably. However, a woman across the isle from me ordered a beer with her breakfast. Now, this is that horrible breakfast where the wake everyone up 2 hours before landing. Granted, it was technically 10am where we were landing, and 3am where we came from, so neither are totally inappropriate, but in the context, i think it proves my initial observation. (27) opinions -- Add your opinion
Thursday, November 15, 2007
# Posted 5:15 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
I wonder whether the debate about the McCain surge is reaching a similar turning point. Supporters like myself are hoping that the surge is more than a trend we are compelled to see because of our faith in our candidate. After all, there is a lot of buzz around his resurgence, although there was lots of buzz just a month or two ago about McCain being dead in the water. So is there evidence?
The latest poll from FoxNews is clearly good news for McCain. For the first time in many months he has second place all to himself, well behind Giuliani but clearly ahead of Thompson. (See question 14.)
The McCain staff is also very excited about evidence from Fox and elsewhere that McCain performs the best against Hillary Clinton in general election trial heats. (Question 16) I've been wondering/hoping whether the electability factor will rise in importance as it becomes more and more apparent to Republicans that they really will be facing Hillary in a general election.
For a comprehensive look at the polls, it is of course always best to visit RealClearPolitics. I'd say that even a supporter like myself has to concede that none of the other GOP primary polls look as good as Fox. Collectively, those polls show a neck-and-neck fight for second place behind Giuliani. McCain is fighting for second place in New Hampshire, but the real big story is Mike Huckabee's surge in Iowa.
With regard to trial heats, the news is better. McCain certainly runs better against Hillary than Giuliani does, but Giuliani was winning his trial heats against her less than a month ago. The data on McCain isn't so robust, however, since the pollster have responded to the conventional wisdom of McCain's demise by running fewer heats, whereas there is plenty of data to analyze for the Clinton-Giuliani matchup.
In summary, I would say this: Mark Twain would have a good chuckle at the premature reports of Sen. McCain's demise. Those who expressed such certainty in that outcome have plenty of egg on their face. But McCain has a long way to go before anyone can call him a front-runner again.
Labels: 2008, John McCain
(3) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 12:31 PM by Taylor Owen
DECIMATING, MOCKING AND SKEWERING: Haven't read Belgravia in a while, but dug in on a flight this morning. Aside from all but endorsing Obama on foreign policy grounds, he is really quite good and calling out bullshit.
He decimates Bush's "demagogic tactics" of listing specific attacks supposedly stopped through torture.
He gives folly to the hypocrisy of presidentialists who at once call for literal interpretations of the constitution while arguing for greater executive power in war, ignoring Madison, who said:
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He decimates Bush's "demagogic tactics" of listing specific attacks supposedly stopped through torture.
He gives folly to the hypocrisy of presidentialists who at once call for literal interpretations of the constitution while arguing for greater executive power in war, ignoring Madison, who said:
In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department. ... War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement".And, citing Anthoy Lewis:
There is a profound oddity in the position of the presidentialists like Yoo, Cheney and Addington. Legal conservatives like to say that the Constitution should be read according to its original intent. But if there is anything clear about the intentions of the framers, it is that they did not intend to create an executive with more prerogative power than George III had. Not even in time of war.But, it's his skewering of this ridiculous excerpt of Gerson's, that really go me chuckling on my early morning flight:
The most complicated question is why, as a rather serious-minded conservative, I am often found in bohemian coffeehouses, comfortable among the revolutionaries. Maybe it is because politics doesn't always predict lifestyle. Maybe because there is a bohemian impulse inside every writer, searching for a little quiet rebellion. Maybe I just like good soy lattes. Whatever the reason, and whatever the T-shirts say, I'll be back.As he apply puts, you "can't help being staggered by the tawdry mediocrity of it all." Indeed.
# Posted 12:30 PM by Taylor Owen
WATERBOARDING, STATESIDE: Sullivan on an interesting case:
(1) opinions
--
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Waterboarding was sometimes used in the Deep South to tortureMore here.
African-Americans and to extract false confessions to alleged crimes.
And when it emerged in an appeal as long ago as 1926, even the
Mississippi Supreme Court ruled it categorically "a specie of torture
well known to the bench and bar of the country," and "barbarous." They
over-turned a guilty verdict for murder by an African-American man
against a white man because such methods invalidated any notion of a
reliable confession.
Friday, November 09, 2007
# Posted 11:33 AM by Taylor Owen
ONE ELECTION TOO EARLY?: In theory, I am sympathetic to Sullivan's thesis that Obama is a post-boomer candidate. In fact, I am sympathetic to most post-boomer theses. Including, recently, this one. Which is awesome. In practice, however, my sense is that it is at least one election too early for a successful post-boomer run. Not least of which because there are just so damn many of them. This of, course, should not prevent Obama himself from capitalizing on the positioning, which he appears to be doing:
I think there's no doubt that we represent the kind of change that Senator Clinton can't deliver on and part of it is generational. Senator Clinton and others, they've been fighting some of the same fights since the '60's and it makes it very difficult for them to bring the country together to get things done.
Labels: Obama
(6) opinions -- Add your opinionThursday, November 08, 2007
# Posted 3:46 PM by Taylor Owen
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS FOREIGN POLICY: In light of recent developments in Pakistan, this might be a good time to post an exchange I had with Jeff Weintraub a few months ago on the subject of democracy promotion as a foreign policy meta-narrative. The first is his response to this blog post of mine. He is in Italics.
Dear Taylor,
Your real point seems to be a call to reject "absolutist democracy promotion rhetoric". That sounds OK to me, depending on what "absolutist" means in this context. But what is it actually supposed to mean? You do on to say, for example ...
Your point seems to be this:
What if one argues that <a> supporting and promoting democracy (and democratic political forces) should be treated as an important general goal of foreign policy, which should not easily be abandoned for considerations of short-term expediency or alleged realpolitik, but at the same time <b> it should not be treated as the only important goal of foreign policy, and <c> we should also recognize that democratic regimes will only work in some circumstances and with certain conditions, so it is neither a universal panacea nor something that can simply be parachuted into any society at any time.
That strikes me as a realistic (as distinct from "realist") approach ... and I suspect that it's one you might actually have some sympathy for, too. Bit if so, then the proper conclusion (it seems to me) is that the defense and promotion of democracy is a "useful meta-narrative" to help guide politics, diplomacy, and foreign policy--as long as it is not understood in an exclusive, unrealistic, or utopian manner.
To put it another way, picking up on David Adesnik's useful comment, any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns. (I guess this is mostly just a restatement of Weber, which is OK with me.) Responding to this dilemma by simply abandoning the core principles--i.e., throwing out the baby with the bathwater--is actually a pretty "absolutist" solution itself, even if it masquerades as pragmatism (or "realism").
Yours for democracy (all things considered),
Jeff Weintraub
P.S. Also, by the way, describing the situation in the PA as "the moment the democratically elected government is undemocratically reconfigured" is a little odd, and somewhat misleading. It suggests that there has just been a Fatah/Abbas coup against Hamas, but matters are a little more complicated than that.
Dear Jeff,
Many thanks for taking the time to write. I hope that my reply shows a slightly greater deference to the subject matter than my admittedly flippant blog post.
I think as you say, that it is best we treat these as two separate issues: The issue of recent US policy regarding the PLO, and the larger utility of democracy as a meta-narrative. First though, let me just say that I agree generally with much of what you propose. I think we would probably agree on the desired end goals of American foreign policy. I am simply uncertain whether democracy promotion is a useful meta-theme in order to achieve these ends. While absolutist might have been a bit harsh, there is certainly a degree of ideological doctrine that drives many to promote the spread of democracy at the cost other policy objectives. Objectives that I would consider more important than, and in many cases prerequisites for, successful democratic development. It is this that concerns me.
First, the purpose of pointing out the discrepancy between the rhetoric of middle eastern democracy promotion and policy decisions regarding the democratically elected government of the PLO, was more to make the point that both you affirm, which is that democracy promotion is messy, and there are many interests that seem to override its promotion. In this case, the perceived threat to the security of an ally.
You are right that whether this policy is actually in the best interest of the US is debatable. Many have argued that Hamas was actually willing to conceded more at the time of the election than at any other time in recent memory (the last constitution, now abandoned, seems to suggest this). This, one would think, would be precisely the time that one would want to engage with them, rather then promoting policies that re-radicalizes them. But, I do not know enough about this to say much more. I will leave that to others to take on.
Regarding this fitting within the rhetoric of the Bush Administration, made by you and Libhawk. I respectfully disagree. I think that there is no doubt that neoconservatives put significantly more weight on the utility of democracy than simply ‘it may or may not be useful’. This seems to me to undercut the principle argument of neoconservatism, for better or worse. Indeed, the very underlying principle of current middle eastern policy is that democracy may be destabilizing, but in the long run, it is better for US interests. From this, however, their follows two perhaps. more interesting points on the nature of US foreign policy.
First, if democracy promotion in the short run is very bad for people living through the transition, which research suggests it is, but is good for long term US interests, then clearly US foreign policy puts the later ahead of the former. Fine, this should be acknowledged. Second, does the manner in which democracy is promoted matter to the long term impact on US interests? Here, I would argue yes. A democracy is obviously not a static state, but rather a representation of its free people. If these people become free through a very violent externally imposed invasion, surely this will effect the end democratic state. If this is even close to correct, then the means of democracy promotion are just as important to US interests as the end democratic state they seek to establish. More thought to the means would also of course enhance the likelihood of bucking the first of these trends, the short term human security of those in the state we are engaging.
On the question of absolutism, you are of course correct that that was hyperbole. However, it is equally disingenuous to claim relativism in the rhetorical use of ‘democracy promotion’ as meta-theme for current US foreign policy. Since the cold war, different people have taken different lines on the degree to which this should be THE guiding principle of US foreign policy. While none may be completely absolutists, I would suggests that some, including current neoconservatives, are ideologically doctrinaire.
In the historical debate on the relative weight that should be placed on the promotion of democracy, or even of the democratic peace theory, neoconservatives certainly fall closer to absolutism than many other foreign policy ideologies. It is this, that I worry has a negative effect on the very things democracy is ideally indented to enable - Higher living standards, human rights, basic needs. Alternatively of course, liberal internationalists are on a different axis of this spectrum, believing that institutions should be promoted which first result in the betterment of the people who live under their mandates, and second, that allow for free and open societies to evolve peacefully. The point is, there is a spectrum, and depending where one puts democracy promotion, there are real policy consequences. i.e.) It was the hope of democracy promotion that put many over the edge in supporting the Iraq war.
Regarding your sensible proposition that: “any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns” I would simply say: Unless, of course, said core principle does more damage than good.
My main point here is not whether democracy is good or bad, but rather whether it is useful, not just as a theme, but as a meta theme of American foreign policy. For me, to be a useful meta-narrative, or core principle, many other principles of a desired foreign policy would fall under it without compromising the cohesiveness of the meta-narrative, or meta-policy. David points out that there always inconstancies in any ‘core principle’. But just how many inconsistencies are we willing to accept, and at what point do these inconsistencies threaten the very benefits the core principle is supposed to enable, ie, human rights, ect. I guess we all draw our own line here. I personally am simply not convinced that democracy promotion, in the Wilsonian, or Bush second inaugural sense, accomplishes this is a coherent way. The inconsistencies are too vast and the human costs too large.
For me the costs to human security of forceful democracy promotion often will outweigh the long term benefits of a society which achieved its democracy through violent means. I simply believe that there are other, more beneficial uses for US force and influence, if the objective is the betterment of the human condition. What is more important than democracy promotion? To me, human security, which I believe is a far more useful overarching goal of an interventionist foreign policy. Of course, a state, democratic or otherwise, may be the cause of insecurity. But this is why we have principles such as r2p and institutions such as the ICC. These are objective to the form of governance, only caring about the treatment of the citizens by the state in question.
I would also ask, whether a democratically elected society achieved through great bloodshed and misery, is better than a non-democratically elected society living in relative peace? This speaks to the problems of conflating democracy promotion with the promotion of basic human rights. The two are undoubtedly often in opposition. Particularly in the transition phase. To me it is simply insufficient to claim long run befits from short term misery in the promotion of democracy. Short term costs cannot be seen as extraneous, or worse, as necessary to the birth of a democratic state. Particularly one being transitioned by outside force. This to me, shows a blind faith in the utility of our actions which is profoundly disrespectful to societies in which we are engaging, or invading, as the case may be.
Finally, on the selective use of a core principle, at what point does the false rhetoric surrounding democracy begin to negatively effect the very things democracy is supposed to enable? This can be far less tangible that polices that directly harm people, and involve the effects of a degraded US position in the world, the impact on the actions of other states and groups, and so on. Democracy promotion as a guiding principle, arguably also limits the positive impact the US can have in countries such as Iran, which are far more open to the human rights discourse, than that of US imposed democratic transition - i.e., regime change.
Kind regards,
Taylor
Hi Taylor,
Thanks for your serious and extensive response to my message. It probably won't surprise you to hear that we partly agree and partly disagree on the issues you raise. (These include some important questions you raise that I had thought of raising myself, regarding the complicated relationships between "human rights" and "democracy" as possible foreign-policy themes. In the broadest sense, I think we agree that these are partly distinct and partly connected, and I would also agree that there can sometimes be tensions between them, but I think you overdo those tensions and draw some conclusions that I find unwarranted. I also think that your discussion slides too easily from the question of <a> whether supporting and encouraging democracy should be an important goal to the quite different question of <b> whether invading countries with US troops and overthrowing there regimes is generally a good technique for establishing successful democratic regimes. Etc.)
But I'm afraid I will have to put off spelling out the details, since I'm tied up with other things right now. Perhaps soon.... In the meantime, I did want to acknowledge receiving your message and thank you for taking the time & trouble to respond to mine. Enjoy yourself in Rome.
Cheers,
Jeff Weintraub
Dear Taylor,
SO LET ME GET THIS STRAIGHT...: The moment the democratically elected government [of the PA] is undemocratically reconfigured is the right time for aid to be re-instated? hmmm, now what lesson does this send to those for whom this aid is rightly intended? [....]Well, at least you recognize that this is "tangential." In this specific case, the aid was neither suspended nor restored in the name of "democracy promotion," but on the basis of other issues (as Patrick Porter correctly pointed out in his comment). No one claimed otherwise. So what's the problem? These are simply two disconnected points. However, if these points are supposed to be connected (as you seem to be suggesting in the overall discussion), then this strikes me as a bit of a non-sequitur.
Tangentially, can we please put the absolutist democracy promotion rhetoric to rest.
Your real point seems to be a call to reject "absolutist democracy promotion rhetoric". That sounds OK to me, depending on what "absolutist" means in this context. But what is it actually supposed to mean? You do on to say, for example ...
Rather, I am making a judgment on those who claim that in certain cases the promotion of democracy is an absolute, and in other cases it is well, a little more flexible.This sounds mostly like a suggestion that some people are sometimes hypocritical (or confused), which is a fair polemical point. But on the face of it, the substantive argument being put forward here is a little confusing. If people treat support for democracy as "flexible" in some circumstances, then it's not being treated as "an absolute". So, again, what's the point?
Your point seems to be this:
Democracy can have good and bad implications, depending wholly on how free people choose to act. Foreign policy must therefore be based on more than simply its "promotion". It is not a particularly useful meta-narrative.The first two sentences here strike me as quite right, as far as they go. (As liberalhawk pointed out in his comment, the position laid out in these two sentences is precisely the rationale underlying US policy toward Hamas, Fatah, and the PA--whether or not you happen to think the specific details of that policy are sensible or not.)
It is not a particularly useful meta-narrative.But that final sentence is either unclear or a non-sequitur. How does that follow from what came before?
What if one argues that <a> supporting and promoting democracy (and democratic political forces) should be treated as an important general goal of foreign policy, which should not easily be abandoned for considerations of short-term expediency or alleged realpolitik, but at the same time <b> it should not be treated as the only important goal of foreign policy, and <c> we should also recognize that democratic regimes will only work in some circumstances and with certain conditions, so it is neither a universal panacea nor something that can simply be parachuted into any society at any time.
That strikes me as a realistic (as distinct from "realist") approach ... and I suspect that it's one you might actually have some sympathy for, too. Bit if so, then the proper conclusion (it seems to me) is that the defense and promotion of democracy is a "useful meta-narrative" to help guide politics, diplomacy, and foreign policy--as long as it is not understood in an exclusive, unrealistic, or utopian manner.
To put it another way, picking up on David Adesnik's useful comment, any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns. (I guess this is mostly just a restatement of Weber, which is OK with me.) Responding to this dilemma by simply abandoning the core principles--i.e., throwing out the baby with the bathwater--is actually a pretty "absolutist" solution itself, even if it masquerades as pragmatism (or "realism").
Yours for democracy (all things considered),
Jeff Weintraub
P.S. Also, by the way, describing the situation in the PA as "the moment the democratically elected government is undemocratically reconfigured" is a little odd, and somewhat misleading. It suggests that there has just been a Fatah/Abbas coup against Hamas, but matters are a little more complicated than that.
Dear Jeff,
Many thanks for taking the time to write. I hope that my reply shows a slightly greater deference to the subject matter than my admittedly flippant blog post.
I think as you say, that it is best we treat these as two separate issues: The issue of recent US policy regarding the PLO, and the larger utility of democracy as a meta-narrative. First though, let me just say that I agree generally with much of what you propose. I think we would probably agree on the desired end goals of American foreign policy. I am simply uncertain whether democracy promotion is a useful meta-theme in order to achieve these ends. While absolutist might have been a bit harsh, there is certainly a degree of ideological doctrine that drives many to promote the spread of democracy at the cost other policy objectives. Objectives that I would consider more important than, and in many cases prerequisites for, successful democratic development. It is this that concerns me.
First, the purpose of pointing out the discrepancy between the rhetoric of middle eastern democracy promotion and policy decisions regarding the democratically elected government of the PLO, was more to make the point that both you affirm, which is that democracy promotion is messy, and there are many interests that seem to override its promotion. In this case, the perceived threat to the security of an ally.
You are right that whether this policy is actually in the best interest of the US is debatable. Many have argued that Hamas was actually willing to conceded more at the time of the election than at any other time in recent memory (the last constitution, now abandoned, seems to suggest this). This, one would think, would be precisely the time that one would want to engage with them, rather then promoting policies that re-radicalizes them. But, I do not know enough about this to say much more. I will leave that to others to take on.
Regarding this fitting within the rhetoric of the Bush Administration, made by you and Libhawk. I respectfully disagree. I think that there is no doubt that neoconservatives put significantly more weight on the utility of democracy than simply ‘it may or may not be useful’. This seems to me to undercut the principle argument of neoconservatism, for better or worse. Indeed, the very underlying principle of current middle eastern policy is that democracy may be destabilizing, but in the long run, it is better for US interests. From this, however, their follows two perhaps. more interesting points on the nature of US foreign policy.
First, if democracy promotion in the short run is very bad for people living through the transition, which research suggests it is, but is good for long term US interests, then clearly US foreign policy puts the later ahead of the former. Fine, this should be acknowledged. Second, does the manner in which democracy is promoted matter to the long term impact on US interests? Here, I would argue yes. A democracy is obviously not a static state, but rather a representation of its free people. If these people become free through a very violent externally imposed invasion, surely this will effect the end democratic state. If this is even close to correct, then the means of democracy promotion are just as important to US interests as the end democratic state they seek to establish. More thought to the means would also of course enhance the likelihood of bucking the first of these trends, the short term human security of those in the state we are engaging.
On the question of absolutism, you are of course correct that that was hyperbole. However, it is equally disingenuous to claim relativism in the rhetorical use of ‘democracy promotion’ as meta-theme for current US foreign policy. Since the cold war, different people have taken different lines on the degree to which this should be THE guiding principle of US foreign policy. While none may be completely absolutists, I would suggests that some, including current neoconservatives, are ideologically doctrinaire.
In the historical debate on the relative weight that should be placed on the promotion of democracy, or even of the democratic peace theory, neoconservatives certainly fall closer to absolutism than many other foreign policy ideologies. It is this, that I worry has a negative effect on the very things democracy is ideally indented to enable - Higher living standards, human rights, basic needs. Alternatively of course, liberal internationalists are on a different axis of this spectrum, believing that institutions should be promoted which first result in the betterment of the people who live under their mandates, and second, that allow for free and open societies to evolve peacefully. The point is, there is a spectrum, and depending where one puts democracy promotion, there are real policy consequences. i.e.) It was the hope of democracy promotion that put many over the edge in supporting the Iraq war.
Regarding your sensible proposition that: “any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns” I would simply say: Unless, of course, said core principle does more damage than good.
My main point here is not whether democracy is good or bad, but rather whether it is useful, not just as a theme, but as a meta theme of American foreign policy. For me, to be a useful meta-narrative, or core principle, many other principles of a desired foreign policy would fall under it without compromising the cohesiveness of the meta-narrative, or meta-policy. David points out that there always inconstancies in any ‘core principle’. But just how many inconsistencies are we willing to accept, and at what point do these inconsistencies threaten the very benefits the core principle is supposed to enable, ie, human rights, ect. I guess we all draw our own line here. I personally am simply not convinced that democracy promotion, in the Wilsonian, or Bush second inaugural sense, accomplishes this is a coherent way. The inconsistencies are too vast and the human costs too large.
For me the costs to human security of forceful democracy promotion often will outweigh the long term benefits of a society which achieved its democracy through violent means. I simply believe that there are other, more beneficial uses for US force and influence, if the objective is the betterment of the human condition. What is more important than democracy promotion? To me, human security, which I believe is a far more useful overarching goal of an interventionist foreign policy. Of course, a state, democratic or otherwise, may be the cause of insecurity. But this is why we have principles such as r2p and institutions such as the ICC. These are objective to the form of governance, only caring about the treatment of the citizens by the state in question.
I would also ask, whether a democratically elected society achieved through great bloodshed and misery, is better than a non-democratically elected society living in relative peace? This speaks to the problems of conflating democracy promotion with the promotion of basic human rights. The two are undoubtedly often in opposition. Particularly in the transition phase. To me it is simply insufficient to claim long run befits from short term misery in the promotion of democracy. Short term costs cannot be seen as extraneous, or worse, as necessary to the birth of a democratic state. Particularly one being transitioned by outside force. This to me, shows a blind faith in the utility of our actions which is profoundly disrespectful to societies in which we are engaging, or invading, as the case may be.
Finally, on the selective use of a core principle, at what point does the false rhetoric surrounding democracy begin to negatively effect the very things democracy is supposed to enable? This can be far less tangible that polices that directly harm people, and involve the effects of a degraded US position in the world, the impact on the actions of other states and groups, and so on. Democracy promotion as a guiding principle, arguably also limits the positive impact the US can have in countries such as Iran, which are far more open to the human rights discourse, than that of US imposed democratic transition - i.e., regime change.
Kind regards,
Taylor
Hi Taylor,
Thanks for your serious and extensive response to my message. It probably won't surprise you to hear that we partly agree and partly disagree on the issues you raise. (These include some important questions you raise that I had thought of raising myself, regarding the complicated relationships between "human rights" and "democracy" as possible foreign-policy themes. In the broadest sense, I think we agree that these are partly distinct and partly connected, and I would also agree that there can sometimes be tensions between them, but I think you overdo those tensions and draw some conclusions that I find unwarranted. I also think that your discussion slides too easily from the question of <a> whether supporting and encouraging democracy should be an important goal to the quite different question of <b> whether invading countries with US troops and overthrowing there regimes is generally a good technique for establishing successful democratic regimes. Etc.)
But I'm afraid I will have to put off spelling out the details, since I'm tied up with other things right now. Perhaps soon.... In the meantime, I did want to acknowledge receiving your message and thank you for taking the time & trouble to respond to mine. Enjoy yourself in Rome.
Cheers,
Jeff Weintraub
Labels: democracy promotion
(1) opinions -- Add your opinionMonday, November 05, 2007
# Posted 5:13 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Maybe if the criticism were more persuasive, but John Judis of The New Republic has really done a third-rate job of trying to brand Giuliani as an extremist while praising him just enough to be fair enough for the pages of TNR. In his profile, Judis accuses Giuliani of nothing less than “a reluctance to cede power and a contempt for the democratic process.”
Judis makes it sound like Giuliani is some sort of Putin. Judis basically argues that Giuliani's first term as mayor was a success, but then his inner demons prevailed. After being re-elected:
Giuliani decided that he needed to suppress not only petty criminals, but also jaywalkers, street vendors, speeding bicycle messengers, and reckless taxi drivers. "If we don't act in a civil manner here, we can't thrive as individuals or as the capital of the world," Giuliani announced in February 1998. Giuliani's new campaign, billed "Creating a More Civil City," was met with strikes from cab drivers and food vendors, as well as angry reactions from citizens threatened with arrest for jaywalking. Giuliani finally gave up on it, but, the next year, he took on the New York art scene. He tried to stop the Brooklyn Museum from putting on a provocative show, "Sensation," which he called "sick stuff." Giuliani's attempt to cut off city funding for the museum and fire its trustees was defeated in court...It reminds me of that famous poem by Martin Niemoller about the Third Reich. First they came for the street vendors, and nobody protested. Then they came for the jaywalkers and nobody protested. Then they came for the Art Museum and nobody protested. Finally, they came for me and there was nobody left to protest.
Andrew Kirtzman attributes Giuliani's threats against the Brooklyn Museum to a desire to curry favor with upstate New Yorkers whose votes he would have needed to win the 2000 Senate election against Hillary Clinton. And, indeed, Giuliani currently brags about his bid to shut down the exhibit when trying to woo social conservatives. But this move, like his poorly executed expansion of the Street Crime Unit and his crusade against street vendors and jaywalkers, was consistent with Giuliani's growing commitment to use his authority at the expense of liberty.
I tend to agree that Giuliani’s threats against the Brooklyn Museum were a political stunt. That’s not my kind of politics. But rather than any sort of contempt for the democratic process, it shows that Giuliani will engage in the sort of pandering that is part of our proud democratic tradition.
But worse was yet to come:
Perhaps the most telling example of Giuliani's attempt to expand his authority came after September 11. In the crisis created by the terrorist attacks, Giuliani excelled as a leader. He was calm and eloquent, a voice of reassurance while the president, aloft in Air Force One, remained curiously silent. But, even before the dust had settled over Ground Zero, Giuliani began lobbying the New York legislature to repeal the city's two-term limit so he could run again, while simultaneously pressuring the candidates vying for his office to accept a 90-day extension of his term. Giuliani's moves showed a reluctance to cede power and a contempt for the democratic process. It was a demonstration of how far he would go in the pursuit of authority.Lobbying. Pressuing. Forgive me for sounding a bit cynical, but does that represent contempt for the democratic process, or what democratic politics usually consists of?
Coming from Judis and TNR, this kind of exaggeration makes me think that Democrats don’t have too much ammunition when it comes to Giuliani’s record. And if Giuliani were nominated, his campaign could proudly observe that even excessive critics like Judis credit him with:
I grew up in New York City. I lived there until 1995 and visited often until 1999. What happened in New York seemed like a miracle. A city condemned to persistent failure and decline suddenly discovered its former glory. It really felt like the greatest city in the world.The broken windows theory [of law enforcement] fit Giuliani's view of liberty and authority. It meant that, in order to create order and encourage moral liberty, citizens would have to allow the police to discourage behavior that was often only marginally illegal.
Giuliani hired Bratton, Boston's police chief, to put the strategy into practice -- and, supplemented by the innovative use of computers to single out and target high-crime neighborhoods, it had a dramatic effect on New York's crime rate. Giuliani's detractors would later say that the decline began under Dinkins, but that is misleading. The city's murder rate reached an all-time high in 1990, then declined slightly over the next two years. But it was only after Giuliani took office that the crime rate declined precipitously -- starting in 1994, when it fell by 12 percent. New York's reduction in crime also far exceeded the national average -- 16 percent in the first half of 1995 compared to one percent nationally.
Giuliani enjoyed similar success in driving the Mafia out of both the Fulton Fish Market and the commercial garbage business. He also reduced fraud in New York's welfare rolls -- no small accomplishment. From 1989 to 1995, more than 270,000 New Yorkers were added to the welfare rolls. After Giuliani instituted fingerprint checks and home visits in 1995 -- an infringement on liberty to be sure -- the welfare rolls declined by 18 percent the first year.
Giuliani easily won reelection in 1997 and enjoyed widespread popularity -- even in parts of the black community. Black leaders like the Reverend Floyd Flake appreciated that Giuliani's policing methods -- however intrusive -- had revived neighborhoods that had been riven by drugs and guns. As journalist Andrew Kirtzman put it in his book on the Giuliani years, "The essential truth of '97 -- that life on the streets was calmer, safer, saner -- was just as relevant to the poor of Bed-Sty as to the prosperous of Brooklyn Heights.”
Labels: 2008, Rudy Giuliani
(11) opinions -- Add your opinionWednesday, October 31, 2007
# Posted 12:41 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
I admit that I sympathize with his message. Yet after all the failures in Iraq before 2007, I'm still afraid of letting myself get too confident. All of the clear indications of progress seem too good to be true. Kagan lists some of them:
In the past five months, terrorist operations in and around Baghdad have dropped by 59 percent. Car bomb deaths are down by 81 percent. Casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 percent. And violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan--traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks--was the lowest in three years.It would be useful if the Standard provided links or footnotes. I have plenty of confidence in Kagan as analyst, but every statistic is a controversy in this war, so I'd like to go back to the sources and make sure the numbers are right.
Anyhow, Kagan is crystal clear about the fact that we have won the battle but not the war. Not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan. And Iran looms on the horizon, still working against us in Iraq. We've got a long way to go. (17) opinions -- Add your opinion
Sunday, October 28, 2007
# Posted 11:56 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
The report seemed pretty reasonable to me. According to its second paragraph:
UNAMI recognizes the enormous difficulties facing the Iraqi Government in its efforts to restore law and order. Its law enforcement personnel are under relentless attack by insurgency groups, and both Sunni and Shi’a armed groups carry out direct attacks on civilians through suicide bombings, abductions and extrajudicial executions while making no distinction between civilians and combatants. Such systematic or widespread attacks against a civilian population are tantamount to crimes against humanity and violate the laws of war, and their perpetrators are subject to prosecution.That may seem pretty obvious, but I consider it a small victory when even the UN recognizes that anti-American forces are the actual perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
Of course, the report by no means ignores any potential violations by the United States. It discusses the problem of armed contractors such as Blackwater as well as continuing concerns about the treatment of detainees. One of the most interesting sections, especially in light of the previous post, is the one about US air strikes and their relationship to civilian casualties. The UN reports an array of incidents in which 88 Iraqi civilians were "reportedly" killed.
Why "reportedly"? That isn't clear. Presumably it's just a reminder that reliable data is very hard to come by in Iraq. Anyhow, assuming that 88 civilians were killed in the second quarter of the year, that number is in the same ballpark as IBC's assessment that 417 Iraqi civilians were killed by air strikes in the first nine months of the year.
In a comment on an earlier post, one of our readers observed that
The [UN] report makes it clear that U.S. air strikes in densely populated civilian areas are violations of international human rights law. A footnote to the section on "MNF military operations and the killing of civilians" explains, "Customary international humanitarian law demands that, as much as possible, military objectives must not be located within areas densely populated by civilians. The presence of individual combatants among a great number of civilians does not alter the civilian character of an area."That quotation is accurate, but the first sentence is rather misleading. The relevant section of the UN report (see p.9) never says that US air strikes targeted densely populated civilian areas or that US air strikes violated the laws of war. Perhaps that is what the footnote implies. But the quotation above hardly establishes a clear standard for how a counterinsurgent force should deal with an adversary that uses the population around it as camouflage or even human shields.
Labels: civilian casualties, Iraq, United Nations
(19) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 10:50 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
I don't buy it. It is essential, of course, to inflict as few civilian casualties as possible in the process of counterinsurgency operations. To that effect, Kaplan cites the Army's official manual for counterinsurgency operations, whose production was supervised by Gen. Petraeus shortly before his return to Iraq:
An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents' benefits. … For these reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes carefully during [counterinsurgency] operations, neither disregarding them outright nor employing them excessively.If certain other generals were in charge, I might be seriously concerned that they were ignoring the sound doctrine elaborated by the Army's field manual. But my gut says that Petraeus is too smart to ignore his own good advice.
What really matters, however, is not my gut. It's the evidence. Kaplan writes that:
The research group Iraq Body Count estimates that 417 Iraqi civilians died from January to September of this year as a result of airstrikes. This is only a bit less than the estimated 452 deaths caused by airstrikes in the previous two years combined.I'm willing to give some weight to the IBC numbers, even though they are a far-left anti-war activist organization, not just a "research group". As OxBlog has shown in the past, IBC won't let the truth get in the way of their anti-war publicity efforts.
But for the moment, let's assume that IBC got it right. Instead of 200+ civilian casualties, this year there will be around 500 inflicted by US airstrikes. According to iCasualties.org, approximately 15,000 Iraqi civilians have died since the beginning of this calendar year. If US airstrikes have accounted for 417 deaths, that would represent slightly less than 3% of the total. From a human perspective, that is still a tragedy. From a strategic perspective, I have a hard time believing that this kind of fluctuation would have a major impact on Iraqi public opinion.
Yet Kaplan suggests that it does. In a companion piece, he reviews some recent public opinion data from Iraq which indicate that hostility to the US is rising. I haven't had time to review those data in detail, so I will simply observe for now that even Kaplan doesn't draw a clear connection between the public opinion data and the increase in air strikes.
Aside from the IBC data, Kaplan points to another indicator that air strikes save American lives at the cost of Iraqi ones:
In the first nine months of 2007, Air Force planes dropped munitions on targets in Iraq more often than in the previous three years combined.That is just plain bad analysis. The leading killer of US troops for quite a while has been the improvised explosive device, or IED. Our casualties have been down significantly over the past couple of months because so many fewer troops are being killed by IEDs. This month, 15 American troops have been killed by IEDs. In May, when US casualties were at their peak, we lost almost 90 soldiers and marines to IEDs.
More telling still, the number of airstrikes soared most dramatically at about the same time that U.S. troop fatalities declined.
It should be pretty clear that air strikes can't protect our troops from IEDs. As Kaplan himself observes, air strikes get called in when troops are facing a tough objective, for example a fortified house with insurgents inside. In contrast, IEDs hit our patrols and convoys at the beginning of battle, often taking our forces by surprise.
So, if using more air strikes can't explain our recent success on the battlefield, what can? On that point, I'll stick with the conventional wisdom. First and foremost, Coalition forces have forged a strategic alliance with numerous Sunni tribes, bringing them into the fight against Al Qaeda and giving us the intelligence necessary to be more effective in our own operations. In other words, progress on the political front has led to progress on the military front.
Labels: civilian casualties, Iraq
(3) opinions -- Add your opinionTuesday, October 23, 2007
# Posted 12:16 AM by Ariel David Adesnik
In almost all ways, Giuliani and McCain have been respectful rivals. At an earlier debate, Giuliani said that, if he weren't in the race, he probably would be endorsing McCain...Especially in New Hampshire, where the third-place McCain is only a few points behind Giuliani and even tied for second with Hizzoner in a recent poll.
But as rivals, neither has fully appreciated the damage the other could do to his hopes of winning the Republican nomination. McCain made the mistake first; now Giuliani threatens to repeat it...
McCain's summer implosion appeared to have ended all hope for his candidacy. On Sunday night, however, McCain was full of life on the stage in Orlando. If not the clear winner of the liveliest Republican debate of the year, he delivered many of the evening's most memorable moments...
The last thing Giuliani needs now is a McCain on the rebound.
Labels: 2008, John McCain
(23) opinions -- Add your opinionFriday, October 19, 2007
# Posted 11:33 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
WASHINGTON - On a dusty street in Samarra, a bustling city north of Baghdad, two brothers, 10 and 12, are carrying plastic bags of groceries home from the market. Approaching an intersection guarded by U.S. troops, they strip off their white undershirts and wave them in the air as they cautiously venture across. Suddenly, shots."Mundane". As if American soldiers killing white-flag waving Iraqi children were an everyday occurrence. Certainly it happens. The case described is taken directly from Army documents. Sadly, the Army denied the boys' father compensation for their deaths. The article continues:
Down goes the 10-year old, his stomach ripped by bullets. Down goes the 12-year-old with his stomach shot away.
This snapshot, as documented by Iraqi witnesses, is the mundane and perhaps inevitable collision between Iraqi civilians and heavily armed troops who are maneuvering, against a shadowy enemy, entirely within a civilian world of schoolchildren, bustling markets and traffic jams.
But for Iraqis such as the father and extended family of the two boys killed in Samarra in October 2005, nothing "explains or palliates their loss," said Gary Solis, a retired Marine officer and expert on military-civilian clashes who teaches law at Georgetown University. "The U.S. usually -- almost always -- becomes the object of the survivors' anger and hatred."This argument is both cliche and dead wrong. If killing innocent people translated directly into unpopularity, then the Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias would be the least popular forces in Iraq, not the US military. Yet article after article gets written in which civilian deaths inflicted by our forces are held up as the 'real' explanation of Iraqi resentment, without the author even bothering to ask about the impact on Iraqi public opinion of the tens of thousands of intentional murders committed by other Iraqis.
That could explain the anger, baffling to some outsiders, that many Iraqis express toward the United States, rather than gratitude for toppling Saddam Hussein. According to an August poll of more than 2,000 people across Iraq, 72 percent said the American presence in Iraq is making things worse, up from 69 percent in February. Eight-five percent said they had "not much" or "no" confidence in U.S. forces, up from 66 percent in 2004.
Now, as you probably know, I firmly subscribe to the school of counterinsurgency doctrine that recommends the minimum necessary use of force (although the minimum is still considerable in the midst of war). I subscribe to this theory because there is an inevitable double standard in operation, whereby our adversaries can exploit ethnic, sectarian or other identities to ensure that we are judged more harshly for doing less damage. That is simply a challenge the counterinsurgent must overcome.
To be fair, the Sun's correspondent observes that:
American troops are exhaustively trained to avoid harming innocent civilians, and they operate under strict rules that govern when lethal force can be used. Unlike private security contractors, U.S. military clashes with civilians are routinely investigatedBut what is that kind of throw-away caveat worth in article that describes in gory detail only our tragic mistakes but never the enemy's atrocities?
I also found it rather galling that the Sun first described several cases in which the US military found loopholes to avoid paying out compensation for civilian casualties, but only reported in the final paragraphs of the article that the US military has spent tens of millions of dollars on precisely that kind of compensation. If you only read the first half of this article, you'd be left with the impression that the US military regularly kills children and then tries to nickel-and-dime its way out of the problem.
Labels: Iraq
(17) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 11:24 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
As Dan correctly points out, it is each campaign's foreign policy staff that actually writes the essay. But the staffs write what their candidates want, and the candidates approve only what they want, so this is not a trivial exercise. To this day, Condi's article from the 2000 campaign is frequently cited (if only to remind the audience that she once was a realist).
Also, Dan's post about "engagement" as the fairy dust of foreign policy is a must. He's writing about John Edwards, but the lesson applies far more broadly.
Labels: 2008, Hillary, John McCain
(5) opinions -- Add your opinionThursday, October 18, 2007
# Posted 9:43 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
On the morning that Petraeus testified, The Times published that MoveOn.org ad with the ''General Betray Us'' headline. Without distinguishing between an opinion piece and a news report, the ad said that, ''according to The New York Times, the Pentagon has adopted a bizarre formula for keeping tabs on violence. For example, car bombs don't count. The Washington Post reported that assassinations only count if you're shot in the back of the head -- not the front.''But really, what's wrong with using rumors and imaginary facts to serve the noble purpose of ending this terrible war?
After a week of looking into these conflicting reports, interviewing government officials, policy experts and keepers of independent databases on Iraq, here is what I have found:
Back-of-the-head, front-of-the-head is not a distinction the military uses to count victims of sectarian violence. The military's manual for measuring sectarian violence, declassified the day after Krugman's column ran, says that civilians ''shot anywhere in the head'' are counted. On Sept. 25, in a detailed account of how the military counts victims of sectarian violence, The Post quoted an Army chief warrant officer as saying that ''a single shot to the head'' is a sign of sectarian violence.
Car bombings do count. The unclassified manual, ''MNF-I Ethno-Sectarian Violence Methodology,'' says car bombings at such places as mosques or markets are to be counted. Civilians killed in car bombings not deemed sectarian, like an attack on a U.S. convoy, are still counted in the overall casualty numbers.
Labels: Iraq
(13) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 9:09 PM by Ariel David Adesnik
Recently, IBC faced quite a dilemma. By early September, its data had begun to show a correlation between the surge of US forces and a visible reduction in the number of Iraqi civilians being killed. Remarkably, this development led IBC to worry that the anti-war left might consider it a shill for the Bush administration. In its defense, IBC explained that it:
...is aware that official reports are imminent concerning the progress of the US Government’s New Security Plan or ‘surge.’ However, IBC’s work is not linked to the political calendar, and the charts above are not intended to be directly comparable to data which may be supplied from official sources.You have to give IBC credit for hoping that enough Iraqis would die to discredit the surge. Sadly the terrorists and death squads failed to deliver. And the statistics from October aren't any better, even according to IBC. If you add up IBC's list of recent events, the total so far this month is around 600. Still horrific, but a far cry from the numbers of this spring or last fall.
These charts sometimes indicate a modest improvement in the security situation for ordinary Iraqis post-surge, and this is not disputed. But these charts will tend to under-represent reported violence for the more recent periods, for the reasons stated above. The observed downward trend in these charts will likely become less marked as data still in the pipeline is added (see Recent Events for as yet unprocessed data).
Now, it's worth keeping in mind that accurate statistics about the civilian death toll are hard to come by. iCasualties, another site with no sympathies for the US war effort, list the current October toll at just over 400. For a look at the challenge of compiling such gruesome and tragic statistics, I highly recommend a recent column by Clark Hoyt, the NYT's public editor.
In closing, it is worth keeping mind a good point made by IBC, a point that has merit in spite of its authors' agenda:
It is important to place the events of 2007 in context. Levels of violence reached an all-time high in the last six months of 2006. Only in comparison to that could the first half of 2007 be regarded as an improvementWe should never forget how much Iraqis have suffered because of our failures as an occupying power. The actual killers were Sunni terrorists and Shi'ite death squads, but a successful occupation could have saved thousands and thousands of lives.
Labels: Iraq, Iraq Body Count, surge
(8) opinions -- Add your opinion
